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Abstract
With the proliferation of cheap bulk SSD storage and better batteries in the last few
years we are experiencing an explosion in the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices
flooding the market, smartphone connected point-of-sale devices (e.g. Square), home
monitoring devices (e.g. NEST), fitness monitoring devices (e.g. Fitbit), and smart-
watches. With new IoT devices come new security threats that have yet to be adequately
evaluated.
We propose µLeech, a new embedded trusted platform module for next-generation
power scavenging devices. Such power scavenging devices are already widely deployed.
For instance, the Square point-of-sale reader uses the microphone/speaker interface of
a smartphone for communications and as a power supply. Such devices are being used
as trusted devices in security-critical applications, without having been adequately evalu-
ated. µLeech can securely store keys and provide cryptographic services to any connected
smartphone. Our design also facilitates physical side-channel security analysis by provid-
ing interfaces to facilitate the acquisition of power traces and clock manipulation attacks.
Thus µLeech empowers security researchers to analyze leakage in next-generation em-
bedded and IoT devices and to evaluate countermeasures before deployment.
Even the most secure systems reveal their secrets through secret-dependent computa-
tion. Secret-dependent computation is detectable by monitoring a system’s time, power,
or outputs. Common defenses to side-channel emanations include adding noise to the
channel or making algorithmic changes to mitigate specific side-channels. Unfortunately,
existing solutions are not automatic, not comprehensive, or not practical.
We propose an isolation-based approach for eliminating power and timing side-channels
that is automatic, comprehensive, and practical. Our approach eliminates side-channels
by leveraging integrated decoupling capacitors to electrically isolate trusted computation
from the adversary. Software has the ability to request a fixed-power/time quantum of
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isolated computation. By discretizing power and time, our approach controls the gran-
ularity of side-channel leakage; the only burden on programmers is to ensure that all
secret-dependent execution differences converge within a power/time quantum.
We design and implement three approaches to power/time-based quantization and iso-
lation: a wholly-digital version, a hybrid version that uses capacitors for time tracking,
and a full-custom version. We evaluate the overheads of our proposed controllers with
respect to software implementations of AES and RSA running on an ARM-based mi-
crocontroller and hardware implementations AES and RSA using a 22nm process tech-
nology. We also validate the effectiveness and real-world efficiency of our approach by
building a prototype consisting of an ARM microcontroller, an FPGA, and discrete circuit
components.
Lastly, we examine the root cause of Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel attacks on
Integrated Circuits (ICs) to augment the Quantized Computing design to mitigate EM
leakage. By leveraging the isolation nature of our Quantized Computing design, we can
effectively reduce the length and power of the unintended EM antennas created by the
wire layers in an IC.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the proliferation of cheap bulk SSD storage and better batteries in the last few years
we are experiencing an explosion in the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices flood-
ing the market, smartphone connected point-of-sale devices (e.g. Square), home monitor-
ing devices (e.g. NEST), fitness monitoring devices (e.g. Fitbit), and smart-watches [1].
With new IoT devices come new security threats that have yet to be properly evaluated [2].
The Square point-of-sale unit, in particular, has gained traction in the market. The
versatility and convenience of the design have propelled the product into widespread
adoption. What makes the Square design unique is that it uses the microphone/speaker
interface to power the unit as well as to facilitate the communication between the device
and the smartphone. Since speaker/microphone is the only universal interface present in
all smartphones the Square device is transparently interchangeable from one smartphone
to the other.
The Square point-of-sale unit iterated through three edition, due to security threats [3].
The first version was susceptible to man in the middle attacks as all communication be-
tween the Square and smartphone was not encrypted [4]. To address this there next iter-
ation implemented encrypted communication at the cost of power, requiring an internal
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coin cell battery [4]. Their third edition addresses both encryption and power require-
ments with a customized copyrighted low power IC [4]. These version iterations were
dictated by security vulnerabilities that were overlooked and compromised the intended
objective of the device, i.e. secure transactions.
The focuses of this thesis are the security threat presented by physical side-channel
leakage of IoTs such as the Square point-of-sale. To that end, we design and evalu-
ate power and timing side-channel leakage of µLeech. µLeech is a custom IoT device
modeled off of the Square point-of-sale that acts as a universal power scavenging Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) for smartphones. We augment µLeech to serve as a side-channel
evaluation platform to evaluate side-channel leakage present in lower power scavenging
IoT devices. In the course of our evaluation, we propose a new countermeasure cen-
tered around isolation. Our Quantization Controller design leverages power scavenging
techniques to isolate power leakage during secure execution to create uniform power and
timing footprints. We augment our countermeasure to include defenses against thermal,
power glitching, memory fault, and EM attacks.
1.1 Background
All computing devices generate side-channel emanations as a byproduct of physical im-
plementation and computation [5]. The key to side-channel analysis is the interpretation
of these leaks to reveal secrets. As such, there are many different side-channel leaks
used to capture secrets. These include: power [6], timing [7], electromagnetic [8], acous-
tic [9], memory remanence [10], and thermal [11]. The two most commonly exploited
side-channels in literature are power and timing [12]. The popularity of these two side-
channels is due to the high bit rate and fine-grain (e.g., per clock cycle) information that
they expose to the attacker. To gain access to this wealth of secret-revealing information,
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an attacker only needs to be able to measure the current consumed by the victim device.
Side-channel countermeasures focus on reducing the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Tech-
niques such as noise introduction and incorporating randomness focus on raising the noise
threshold [13]. Thereby making it challenging to differentiate between the leaked signal
and random noise. On the other hand techniques such as leakage reduction and obfusca-
tion aim to reduce the leaking signal strength within the noise threshold [13]. By reducing
the SNR, any countermeasure can increase the difficulty of filtering out the leaking signal
from the noise level. However, the real trick with any countermeasure is to not push leak-
age from one channel to another, as there is a symbiotic relationship between the different
side-channels:
• Power vs. Timing: Implementing any limitations on a power rail would directly
correlate to any variability in execution performance. Therefore a leakage hidden
on the Power rail would be exposed through timing analysis.
• Timing vs. Power: Implementing any timing limitations to hide execution would
directly translate into power consumption. Executions that obfuscate leakage by
forcing constant execution times would leak variable power draw.
• Timing vs. Fault: Implementing counters to conceal timing differences creates
opportunities for fault attacks that invert the expected ordering of system events.
Temperature-based fault attacks affect the rate of leakage of a capacitor while not
effecting digital counters.
• Power vs. Electromagnetic: Hiding the power capacitor recharge side-channel
requires shorting the capacitor’s voltage down to a fixed level. This creates a large
current spike visible in the electromagnetic spectrum. The magnitude of this current
spike indicates how much current was on the power capacitor after secure execu-
tion, thus revealing secret information.
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Without care, eliminating the leak from one side-channel shifts the information to
another channel. A complete solution would have to addresses these threats in unison.
1.2 Problem Statement
Accompanying the recent explosion of smartphones and tablets is a growing trend for new
IoTs that can interface with those devices. These IoTs are designed with the express pur-
pose of being small, easy to use, and convenient. Unfortunately, in many cases, IoTs are
deployed as trusted devices in security critical applications before they have been properly
evaluated. For the purposed of this work, we are interested in the physical side-channel
leakage of such IoTs. While side-channel attacks have been extensively researched the
effect of secure executions on such low power, embedded, and highly connected devices
have not been properly evaluated. IoTs perform low power intermittent execution using
energy harvesting inputs. As such IoTs have drastically different electrical characteristics
that need to be properly evaluated for side-channel vulnerabilities.
Our threat model assumes an attacker with knowledge of the software running on as
well as with full physical access to the IoT. The attacker’s objective is to extract secret
information through non-destructive, non-invasive, timing and power side-channel analy-
sis. We assume that the attacker can also control the power supplied to the device as well
as its environment to induce power and thermal faults.
We develop a custom low power IoT used for intermittent secure execution to ob-
serve any side-channel leakage, using a customized side-channel evaluation platform. In
the course of our evaluation, we propose a new countermeasure centered around isola-
tion. Our proposed design focuses on reducing the signal by leveraging power scavenging
techniques to isolate power leakage during secure execution and creating uniform power
and timing footprints. Following these observations, we develop and augment a compre-
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hensive and mostly automatic power and timing side-channel defense that is immune to
thermal and power fault attacks.
1.3 Summary of Contributions
• Designing a custom IoT device, µLeech, that can mimic existing IoT communi-
cation protocols, power scavenging features, intermittent execution, and security-
critical applications.
• Developed and optimized µLeech as a low power TPM module for smartphones
• Designing a side-channel evaluation platform of µLeech to facilitate the acquisition
of physical side-channel leakage.
• Designing a countermeasure by leveraging energy harvesting techniques to isolate
power and timing side-channel leakage.
• Augmenting our countermeasure to protect against temperature, fault, and power-
glitching attacks.
• Prototype our countermeasure to test for side-channel leakage under real-world
conditions
• Evaluating the source of electromagnetic side-channel leakage from ICs
• Modeling the primary source of electromagnetic side-channel leakage from ICs
• Extending the proposed countermeasure to reduce electromagnetic side-channel
leakage
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1.4 Dissertation Outline
• Chapter 2 describes the design of µLeech a new embedded TPM for IoTs and its
development as a side-channel evaluation platform. µLeech can mimic the com-
munication protocols, power scavenging effects, and cryptographic executions of
other IoTs. While such devices are used as trusted devices in security critical ap-
plications, they have not been properly evaluated yet. µLeech can securely store
keys and provide cryptographic services to any connected smartphone. Our design
facilitates physical side-channel security analysis by providing interfaces to enable
easier acquisition of power traces and clock manipulation attacks. Thus µLeech
empowers security researchers to analyze leakage in next generation embedded and
IoT devices and to evaluate countermeasures before deployment.
• Chapter 3 presents Quantization Controller, a side-channel isolation countermea-
sure that creates uniform power and timing side-channel footprints while protect-
ing against temperature, fault, and power glitching attacks. Our design leverages
integrated decoupling capacitors to electrically isolate trusted computation from
the adversary. Software has the ability to request a fixed-power/time quantum of
isolated computation. By discretizing power and time, our approach controls the
granularity of side-channel leakage; the only burden on programmers is to ensure
that all secret-dependent execution differences converge within a power/time quan-
tum. We design and implement three approaches to power/time-based quantization
and isolation: a wholly-digital version, a hybrid version that uses capacitors for
time tracking, and a full-custom version. These designs are evaluated with respect
to software implementations of AES and RSA running on an ARM-based micro-
controller and hardware implementations of AES and RSA using a 22nm process
technology. We also validate the effectiveness and real-world efficiency of our ap-
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proach by building a prototype consisting of an ARM microcontroller, an FPGA,
and discrete circuit components.
• Chapter 4 examines the root cause of Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel attacks
on Integrated Circuits (ICs) to augment the Quantization Controller design to mit-
igate EM leakage. EM attacks on ICs design have long followed a black box
approach. We identify and examine the root cause of EM side-channel attacks,
near field radiation from an ICs wire layers that act as unintended antennas. Com-
bining these findings with IC power management protocols, we can identify that
the major contributing EM leakage are the top two wire layers that disseminate
power throughout the IC. These layers are intentionally thicker to carry more cur-
rent thereby maintain power and timing benchmarks. Current IC technology are
only exasperating the leakage from these top power layers, as shown by examin-
ing Intel’s IC technology: 180nm [14], 130nm [15], 65nm [16], 45nm [17], and
32nm [18]. We propose an augmentation to our Quantization Controller design, by
leveraging its isolation nature to reduce the length and power of the unintended EM
antennas created by the wire layers.
• Chapter 5 concludes this work with a summary of the results and recommendations
for further work. We discuss the effectiveness of µLeech as mimicking low power
IoT devices, using µLeech as a side-channel evaluation platform, leveraging isola-
tion as a countermeasure in our Quantization Controller design, and our proposed
Quantization Controller EM augmentation. Our proposed design would effectively
reduce side-channel leakage by protecting against multiple side-channel attacks:
power [6], timing [7], electromagnetic [8], thermal [11], power glitching [19], and
Memory fault [20] attacks.
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Chapter 2
µLeech: A Side-Channel Evaluation
Platform for IoT
With Moore’s law continuing to drive down the cost of computation, we are experiencing
an explosion in the number of embedded devices flooding the market, including smart-
phone connected point-of-sale devices, smart home devices or smart-watches. The Square
point-of-sale unit, in particular, has gained traction in the market. The versatility and
convenience of the design has propelled the product into widespread adoption. Such em-
bedded, small footprint, highly connected, and low-power devices make up the backbone
of the Internet of Things (IoT): they are attached to things in our environment we wish
to track and control remotely. These devices are highly susceptible to physical attacks
as there are many of them with loose isolation potentially in the reach of an attacker.
Given physical access, an attacker can steal sensitive secrets, i.e. encryption keys and
authentication credentials.
In this work for the first time we develop a side-channel evaluation platform, µLeech,
which mimicks the form factor and operational characteristics of IoT devices. Our design
is modeled after the Square design, i.e. it uses the microphone/speaker interface to power
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the unit and to communicate between the device and the smartphone. In the development
of our design we started by examining the Hijack project [21]. Ultimately our commu-
nication protocol differs as we do not need to communicate continuous sensor data, but
short bursts of data, draining less power in the process. Our µLeech design acts as a uni-
versal power scavenging unit and may also be used as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
for untrusted smartphones that can execute sensitive queries directly on the µLeech pro-
cessor, e.g. by using secret keys and authentication tokens that are programmed into
µLeech. The fact that these keys will never leave the device keeps them protected.
2.1 Side-Channel Evaluation Platforms
There are many platforms available that can be used to assess vulnerabilities of implemen-
tations to side-channel attacks. Some are commercially available and others developed for
academic use. The following lists the most prominent:
• Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Boards (SASEBO) are standard eval-
uation boards developed by Tohoku University [22]. SASEBO Boards were de-
veloped to perform security tests for side-channel attacks. Their goal was to stan-
dardize the testing requirements of cryptographic modules. They are capable of
evaluating side-channel attacks against cryptographic hardware with FPGAs and
cryptographic software with microprocessor function.
• Flexible Open-source Board for Side-channel analysis (FOBOS) is an academic
platform developed at George Mason University [23]. FOBOS is a platform for
implementation attack resistance testing. FOBOS aims to provide an open-source
platform. Their platform can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of side-channel
analysis countermeasures on FPGA platforms. FOBOS supports multiple FPGA
devices and the necessary software to run differential power analysis attacks.
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• Side-Channel Analysis Resistant Framework (SCARF) is an open-source aca-
demic tool developed by the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Insti-
tute [24]. SCARF can be used for testing countermeasures for side-channel and
fault attacks. They include a number of custom evaluation boards to test the attack
resistance of smart-cards, microprocessors, and FPGAs. SCARF only supports
testing of the devices included in its custom evaluation boards.
The following are a few tools that can be used with these side-channel evaluation
platforms:
• The DPA Workstation is developed by Cryptography Research Inc. [25] and can
be used to perform side-channel analysis including differential power or electro-
magnetic analysis on embedded systems. The DPA Workstation includes its own
environment and proprietary software that can perform side-channel analysis on all
major standard ciphers.
• InspectorSCA is a closed-source device developed by Riscure [26]. This platform
can be used for side-channel analysis and fault analysis. It includes fault injection
hardware and includes proprietary software that can perform side-channel and fault
attacks on standard ciphers.
• ChipWhisperer is an open-source tool-chain for embedded hardware security re-
search [27]. It can be used for side-channel power analysis and glitching and is
known for its synchronous capture technology. Similar tools are commercially
available but far more expensive and closed-source.
Numerous IoT devices have already been deployed as trusted devices in security crit-
ical applications, and yet they have not been properly evaluated for side-channel leakage.
The existing platforms summarized above have characteristics drastically different from
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Figure 2.1: Nexus 4 headset jack available power.
IoT devices. µLeech is a side-channel evaluation platform representative of a power scav-
enging IoT device: power is scavenged from the right audio channel, two-way commu-
nication through the left audio channel and the microphone. Our platform provides the
ability for security researchers to analyze side-channel leakage in next-generation mo-
bile attached embedded devices. Just like SASEBO, FOBOS, and SCARF the µLeech
evaluation platform will include high-quality onboard peripherals to our power and clock
signals, allowing for easy access of signals necessary for side-channel analysis. This
platform will allow for the development and enrollment of countermeasures.
2.2 Overview of the Design
Most cryptographic primitives require short and highly intensive computation. Taking
advantage of this, we designed our power circuit with a capacitor bank that can be dis-
charged and recharged. This allows our processor to perform any cryptographic operation
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while draining the capacitor bank. We optimized our design to allow one round of AES
to be computed before depleting the capacitor bank. Once the capacitor bank is depleted
the processor will hibernate in sleep mode, allowing the capacitor bank to recharge again
for another round of computations. To achieve this, we developed a low power sleep cir-
cuit that notifies the processor when to sleep and wake, thereby allowing the processor to
operate off the limited power generated by our smartphone.
2.2.1 Power Siphoning
In keeping with the concept of a universal jack, our power has to be generated from
the auxiliary jack. Therefore, we have to siphon power from an audio waveform. To
determine the available power from our Nexus 4 headset port, we generated a 500 mV
peak to peak AC audio waveform. A load resistance was connected between the right
audio channel and the common line of the auxiliary jack. While measuring the output
voltage across the resistor and the load current, the load resistance was varied from 0Ω to
15kΩ. We measured a total of 24 different resistor values. Using this data, we generated a
linear fit, represented by the red linear IV curve in Figure 2.1 and the blue power transfer
curve in Figure 2.1. The power transfer curves show that the maximum power transfer
occurs at 85mVrms and 18.87mA rms, with an ideal load of 4.51Ω.
The data in Figure 2.1 shows that it is possible to draw 1.61mW from an ideal matched
load of 4.51Ω. For this power to be useful our power siphoning circuit will have to rectify
the 500mV peak to peak waveform from AC to DC, boost it, and filter it. The power si-
phoning circuit we implemented was modeled off of the Hijack’s power siphoning circuit
[21], with a few modifications. The circuit we implemented is depicted in Figure
The input of the circuit Figure 2.2 is the Right audio channel of the smartphone. The
app we implement will generate a continuous 500mV peak to peak audio waveform only
onto the right audio line. Using this audio line and this circuit we are able to generate a
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Figure 2.2: Power Circuit
Figure 2.3: Power Circuit Analysis
1.8V source for our processor. Key points of the transformation of the 400mV peak to
peak audio waveform through the circuit in Figure 2.2 were captured and illustrated in
Figure 2.3.
The yellow signal is the raw waveform coming out of the smartphone. The first step
in trying to use this audio frequency is to step up the low supply voltage level. Using
a 1:20 micro-transformer we step up the incoming supply voltage level as shown by the
red signal. Normally the next step would be to use a Schottky diode to perform low-loss
blocking. However using a combination of N and P MOSFETs depicted in Figure 2.2, we
can perform a FET-based rectification from AC current to DC. This allows us to be able
13
to use the negative part of our input waveform to generate power as well. The spikes on
the low edge of the red signal are generated by the FET bridge that would have otherwise
been clipped out, optimizing our power generating capability. Using the Schottky diode to
provide low-loss blocking, will prevent the capacitor bank from being discharged through
the FET bridge, illustrated by the Blue signal. The final step is to use a 1.8 voltage
regulator to power our processor, the Green signal.
Our goal was to allow our processor to be able to perform more power intensive cryp-
tographic computations, without using a battery and while staying within the limitations
of our smartphone power generating capability. Therefore using this power siphoning cir-
cuit and a series of capacitors, that could be discharging and recharged merely by going
into sleep mode, we are capable of allowing our device to remain charged for at least one
round of AES.
2.2.2 Capacitor Bank
Every smartphone model will have its own power draw model and ideal matched load.
To aid with power management, we implemented a capacitor bank that will aid us in
granting enough power for one round of 128-bit AES. As our processor implementations
continue to evolve, we will continue to optimize our power consumption. However, dif-
ferent cryptographic operations may consume more power than our current 128-bit AES
implementation. This means that our capacitor bank needs to contain enough of a charge
between the time our sleep circuit switches between its wake and sleep state. Knowing
that our sleep circuit activates the processor’s wake state at 1.95V and sleep state at 1.65V
we can calculate the necessary capacitor bank we would need for one round of 128-bit
AES, if we know the current consumption and amount of time it takes. As shown later
AES consumes approximately 555 µA and takes 140µs for one round, see Table 2.3.
Therefore we need a 0.28µF capacitor bank to power one AES round.
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Figure 2.4: Sleep Circuit.
Currently, our capacitor bank was added after our 1.8 voltage regulator. This was done
initially because our measured voltage change were measured after our voltage regulator.
For optimal efficiency, the capacitor bank should be recalculated and inserted before the
voltage regulator. Although the capacitor bank was initially designed for one round of
128-bit AES, the design still works with whatever implementation our processor is com-
puting. As long as the power drops the sleep circuit will activate sleep mode allowing for
the capacitor bank to recharge. Such functionally will be useful with any smartphones as
the bank will aid in allowing for more continuous power.
2.2.3 Sleep Mode
To allow the capacitor bank to recharge as efficiently as possible, we had to minimize
power consumption during sleep mode. In addition, we would need a way of telling
the processor to go to sleep and not to wake up until the capacitor bank was adequately
recharged. For this we built a sleep circuit, illustrated in Figure 2.4, that would tell the
processor through an external interrupt when to go to sleep and when to wake up.
Our sleep circuit uses a total of four 1% tolerance resistors, one low power voltage
reference, and one low power comparator. This circuit has minimal power consumption
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and produces one output signal from the comparator. This signal is driven either high or
low, and can be used as a digital input. When connected to the external interrupt controller
of our processor this signal can be used to notifying our processor when to go to sleep,
low for optimal power performance, and when to wake up.
Atmel’s AVR UC3-L0 has multiple interrupts and external interrupts. The UC3-L0
has a total of seven sleep modes [28]. Only the two highest power consumption sleep
modes can wake up from a synchronous source, ruling out using an internal interrupt
routine. However, all sleep modes, except for shutdown mode can be achieved with an
asynchronous source. Connecting the external signal generated from our sleep circuit
to two external interrupt pin, we can use two external interrupt routines to go to sleep
(low) and wake up (high). Both of these external sleep/wake interrupts have been given
the highest priority to supersede any other interrupts. This is to guarantee that when
our capacitor bank is almost drained the processor will go to sleep before losing power
allowing the capacitor bank to charge up again.
Our processor operates at 1.8V, but using its power thresholds our comparator will
notify the processor to go to sleep at 1.65V and to wake up at 1.95V. Measuring the time
it takes for one round of AES we modified our capacitor bank for ample time to complete
before recharging.
2.2.4 Side-Channel Platform
As a side-channel evaluation platform, our main goal was to provide easy acquisition
of high-quality power signals for Differential Power Analysis (DPA). We added three
1Ω resistors in series to our design before the decoupling capacitors of our processor.
The resistors were placed as close as possible to the processor’s respective pins, and the
copper pads were expanded, to minimize the amount of added noise. One resistor was
added to the ground rail and the other two to the power rails. All three resistors can also
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Figure 2.5: µLeech Evaluation Board.
be individually shorted to allow for custom measurements. The current version of our
evaluation platform is illustrated in Figure 2.5. The three blue shunts are the jumpers to
the three resistors. In addition, we added two external clock sources that can be selected
for our Processor: a 1 MHz crystal and an SMA connector. The SMA connector can be
used to feed a clock signal directly, thus also rendering the board ready for clock-glitching
evaluation.
2.3 Data Communication
The communication protocol was modeled off of Hijack’s communication protocol [21].
This design does not require any analog to digital converters, which results in less power
drain but slower communication speeds. The smartphone transmits analog signals and
the processor transmits in digital, but each communication is handled in the time domain,
using Manchester Encoding [29].
Manchester Encoding is a form of digital encoding where bits are represented by
transitions from one logical state to the other, instead of being represented by a high or
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Figure 2.6: µLeech Execution Cycle.
low signal. This means that instead of having to detect an analog high and low period,
we now have to measure the periods between switches. Allowing a smartphone that can
only output and read audio oscillating waveforms to transmit and receive a waveform with
Manchester encoded data.
For the processor, transmitting in Manchester encoding to the smartphone is straight
forward. The processor can generate a square wave at any frequency, doubling the pe-
riod for a bit flipping, that can simply be interpreted by a smartphone as an oscillating
waveform. On the other hand, decoding incoming data from a smartphone outputting an
oscillating audio waveform instead of a digital signal to the processor is not as straight-
forward. The processor instead will have to determine the period lengths between the
oscillations. Allowing the processor to determine if the incoming Manchester encoded
data is flipping its bit, double the period, or not.
We have modified our communication protocol to work serially and in conjunction
with the overall process of the processor. µLeech is not a continuously operating device
as such it does not need to transmit and receive data continuously. We only transmit
and receive data in bursts when necessary after secure execution. This allows for more
computation cycles and overall less power drain on our system. Figure 2.6 depicts a flow
chart of µLeech execution cycle for an AES implementation.
In Idle our processor is continuously waiting to receive a transmission from the smart-
phone. Once data is received it triggers our communication state-machine that grabs the
incoming data. The state-machine then converts the raw incoming Manchester data into
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binary data. This incoming data includes the instructions for our processor. Using the ob-
tained data our processor then performs it AES encryption/decryption. It then triggers the
transmit state of the state machine. The state machine will then converting the raw data
into Manchester encoded data and transmit this to the smartphone. The transmission burst
is repeated four times by our processor, after which it returns to Idle waiting to receive
further instruction from the smartphone.
Currently, we are transmitting at approximately an average of 0.9kbps. Our current
transmission speeds are unfortunately severely slower than regular digital communica-
tion. This is mainly due to the fact that our data is transmitted in Manchester Encoding
that doubles the number of cycles. In addition, there are delays that are added through our
communication state-machine. In the next iteration we will be optimizing our communi-
cation state-machine for intermittent communication.
2.3.1 Manchester Encoding
Manchester Encoding is a form of digital encoding in which data bits are represented by
transitions from one logical state to the other. The encoding of digital data in Manchester
format defines the binary states of a 1-bit and 0-bit to be transitions rather than static
values. Manchester encoding was developed at the University of Manchester, where the
coding was used to store data on the magnetic drum of a Manchester Mark 1 computer.
There are two opposing conventions for Manchester encoding, both are used by numerous
authors.
The first convention of Manchester Encoding was first published by G. E. Thomas in
1949. It stated that for a 0-bit the signal levels would be low-high and for a 1-bit the signal
levels would be high-low. The second convention used by IEEE 802.4 and IEEE 802.3. It
states that for a 0-bit the signal levels would be high-low and for a 1-bit the signal levels
would be low-high. These two conventions are opposites of each other.
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For our application, we followed the IEEE convention. Illustration examples of Manch-
ester Encoded data can be found in Figures 6 through 9. These examples are illustrations
of an implemented transmission using Hijack’s communication protocol.
• Figure 2.7 is the header of the transmission.
• Figure 2.8 is the transmission byte length.
• Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 are two different data values that were transmitted.
We choose only to use two data values so that the illustration would be simpler to
follow. The transmissions are handled one byte at a time. Each byte has a start bit of 0 and
a parity bit at the end. The actual transmission streams of the processor and smartphone
can be found in Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.18 respectively. The transmission captured
match these illustrations.
Manchester Encoding allows for an overall reduced physical footprint and power con-
sumption due to the lack of digital to analog and analog to digital converters. In addition,
since Manchester Encoding ensures frequent line voltage transitions, which are directly
proportional to their clock rate, an oscillating audio waveform can be manipulated into
representing Manchester Encoded data. This makes it ideal for IoT communication sys-
tems through auxiliary jacks.
2.3.2 Transmit
Data sent from the processor to the smartphone will be sent along the microphone channel
of the auxiliary port. The communication protocols used for creating this audio waveform
were modeled off of Hijack’s communication protocol. The major difference being that
when in this state we only use the transmit portion of Hijack state-machine, as shown
in Figure 2.6. The protocol we implemented to activate the transmit portion of the state
machine is illustrated in Figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.11: µLeech Transmit Flow Chart. Figure 2.12: µLeech Transmit Circuit.
For our transmit protocol we used one of our processors built in synchronous counter
and one asynchronous counter. The counters are only activated when the processor is
in the transmit state (Tx), in Figure 2.6. When the counter is activated, it will trigger
an interrupt every time it reaches a predetermined value. This value is the frequency
of our generated signal, every time the interrupt is triggered is one clock cycle of our
output stream. This event triggered interrupt will do two things: trigger the transmit
state of the state-machine and increment a second asynchronous counter B. The second
counter B is used to keep track of how many transmission have taken place, after four full
transmissions the counter will exit the transmission stat and turn off the counter.
At the hardware level the only important thing with the transmission circuit is to have
a 1k load resistor. The 1k Ohm resistor is necessary to activate the microphone channel
on most smartphones; without it, the smartphone would not know there was data coming
in on the microphone channel. The processor will then output an oscillating square wave-
form approximately 800mv pk to pk. The transmission circuit we implemented is shown
in Figure 2.12.
An example of a transmission stream from our µLeech to our smartphone was cap-
tured and illustrated in Figure 2.14. Using the Manchester encoded byte examples in
Figures 2.7 through 2.10 we can see the data captured in Figure 2.14. The communica-
tion protocol of the processor transmits in the format depicted in Table 2.1.
Each byte has a start bit of 0 and a parity bit at the end. This means each byte trans-
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Byte 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Content Header Length+1 Data0 Data1 Data2 Data3 Data4 Data5 Data6 Data7 Data8 Check Sum
Value 0xDD 10 0xFF 0xFF 0x00 0xFF 0x00 0xFF 0x00 0xFF 0x00 -
Image Figure 2.7 Figure 2.8 Figure 2.9 Figure 2.9 Figure 2.10 Figure 2.9 Figure 2.10 Figure 2.9 Figure 2.10 Figure 2.9 Figure 2.10 -
Table 2.1: Smartphone Transmission Burst.
Figure 2.13: µLeech Transmission - Zoomed in.
Figure 2.14: µLeech Transmission.
mission is actually 10-bits which are then transmitted in LSB in Manchester encoding.
However, in between each byte transmission the state-machine goes into an idle state,
where it continues to transmit digital high for a fixed four delay count. Figure 2.13 depicts
a zoomed in view of the Manchester encoded captured data burst shown in Figure 2.14.
2.3.3 Receive
Data sent from the smartphone to the processor will be sent along the left audio chan-
nel of the auxiliary port. The communication protocols used for interpreting this audio
waveform were modeled off of Hijack’s communication protocol. The major difference
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Figure 2.15: µLeech Receive Flow Chart.
Figure 2.16: µLeech Receive Circuit.
being that when in this state we only use the receive portion of Hijack state-machine, as
shown in Figure 2.6. The protocol we implemented to activate the receive portion of the
state-machine is illustrated in Figure 2.15.
For our receive protocol, we used one of our processors built in synchronous compara-
tor driven interrupt and counter. The comparator and counter are only activated when the
processor is in the receiving state (Rx), in Figure 2.6. When the comparator is activated it
will trigger an interrupt every time there is a bit flip on the incoming Manchester encoded
data stream. This event triggered interrupt will do two things: trigger the receiving state
of the state-machine passing it the counter value and reset the counter. This will allow
the state-machine to know the length of time between bit-flips. Since the incoming data
is represented in Manchester encoding, the state-machine will be able to determine if the
previous bit was flipped or not. Allowing us to decode the income Manchester data into
binary data.
What this means for our hardware, is that we have to feed the comparator in our
processor two inputs: an oscillating audio waveform from the smartphone’s left audio
channel and a constant signal that is the mean voltage level of the oscillating audio wave,
as shown in Figure 2.16.
The smartphone will output an oscillating waveform of approximately 900mV pk to
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Byte 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Content Header Length+1 Data0 Data1 Data2 Data3 Data4 Data5 Data6 Data7 Data8 Check Sum
Value 0xDD 10 0xFF 0xFF 0x00 0xFF 0x00 0xFF 0x00 0xFF 0x00 -
Image Figure 2.7 Figure 2.8 Figure 2.9 Figure 2.9 Figure 2.10 Figure 2.9 Figure 2.10 Figure 2.9 Figure 2.10 Figure 2.9 Figure 2.10 -
Table 2.2: Smartphone Transmission Burst.
Figure 2.17: Smartphone Transmission - Zoomed in.
Figure 2.18: Smartphone Transmission.
pk with a lot of noise. The first step in our receive circuit is to drain out the noise with a ca-
pacitor, then using a pull-up resistor and a pull-down resistor we can generate an 800mV
peak to peak oscillating at a mean of 800mV. However, when you take into account the
additional pull-down resistor built into the processor, on the input pin, the signal is oscil-
lating at a mean of approximately 900mV. This means, for our comparator to trigger we
need to feed it another constant 900mV signal. Since our processor is operating at 1.8V
using a simple voltage divider on our voltage source with equal resistors, we can divide
the voltage level by half and generate a constant input signal of 900mV, with minimal
power loss. This will allow our comparator to trigger exactly when our oscillating audio
signal is switching from low to high, allowing us to retrieve the period length determining
if the Manchester encoded audio waveform is bit flipping or not.
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An example of a transmission stream from our smartphone to our µLeech was cap-
tured and illustrated in Figure 2.18. Using the Manchester encoded byte examples in
Figures 2.7 through 2.10 we can see the data captured in Figure 2.18. The communica-
tion protocol of the smartphone transmits in the format depicted in Table 2.2.
Each byte has a start bit of 0 and a parity bit at the end. This means each byte trans-
mission is actually 10-bits which are then transmitted in LSB in Manchester encoding.
However, in between each byte transmission the state-machine goes into an idle state,
where it continues to transmit digital high for a fixed twenty delay count. Figure 2.17
depicts a zoomed in view of the Manchester encoded captured data burst shown in Fig-
ure 2.18.
2.4 Implementation Results
The performance of our device is evaluated with a focus on power consumption. Our
device is designed to operate solely off of the power generated from an audio waveform.
As a result, we have made numerous modifications to optimize performance within our
power generating capabilities. We optimized for power by modifying our capacitor bank
to at least allow for one round of AES encryption before depletion. For this, we mea-
sured the power consumption of our different modes: idle, sleep, communication, and
AES. Then we measured the duration of each of these modes so that we could accurately
estimate our capacitor bank.
2.4.1 Sleep Mode
There are many different sleep modes available to the UC3-L0. Table 2.3 shows the
power consumption of the lowest three power consumption sleep modes available for a
single supply mode design. The main differences between these three sleep modes are
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Table 2.3: µLeech Power Consumption
Processor State Power Consumption
Idle 539 µA
Receiving Data 588 µA
Transmitting Data Burst 575 µA
128-bit AES Encryption 555 µA
128-bit AES Decryption 555 µA
Sleep Mode Power Consumption
Stop 92.6 µA
DeepStop 68.3 µA
Static 56.7 µA
which clock sources are left enabled. For this reason, our design uses an external clock
crystal that allows us to use DeepStop and Static sleep modes. Static mode requires us
to reinitialize some of our clock signals, and therefore the modules using them, on every
wake-up. For this reason currently, our design uses DeepStop which is less of a power
drain on the overall system for every wake-up cycle.
2.4.2 Active Mode
In active mode, our UC3-L0 is: idling, communicating, or performing AES. Our proces-
sor only checks for incoming data when it is idling and waiting for instructions. Computa-
tions are only executed when the processor receives new incoming data or new instruction
sets. The processor transmissions are executed only when there is a change in the out-
going data and computations have been completed. The transmissions are in short bursts
repeated four times for redundancy error checking. The measured power consumption
of these processor states is listed in Table 2.3. Currently, our design’s highest power
consumption is in our communication protocol.
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2.4.3 128-bit AES
Atmel’s AVR UC3-L0 combines low power consumption and computational capacity.
128-bit AES was implemented in software and tested for power consumption. The power
consumption of 128-bit AES encryption and decryption are shown in Table 2.3. The
measured performances of our processor are operating at a clock speed of 1 MHz. This
clock is generated using an external 1 MHz clock crystal. Encryption and decryption
were timed at 1.378 ms and 1.400 ms respectively. Modifying this external crystal we
can achieve higher performance implementations of AES, but in the process increase our
power consumption.
2.5 Conclusion
µLeech is a low power IoT side-channel evaluation platform. As such, it was optimized
for minimal power consumption. The power consumption of µLeech was optimized by
utilizing the various sleep and active states of the processor. µLeech provides a secure
low power scavenging trusted cryptographic platform for any smartphone. Our design
also includes interfaces to facilitate easy acquisition of high-quality power signals for Dif-
ferential Power Analysis, as well as an SMA connector to manipulate the clock source.
µLeech enables security researchers to analyze leakage in next-generation mobile at-
tached embedded devices and to develop and enroll countermeasures to protect future
IoT devices.
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Chapter 3
Quantized Computing: On-demand
Isolation as a Power and Timing
Side-channel Defense
Side-channel emanations compromise secure execution by revealing secret data [5]. There
are a wide range of side-channels attackers use to extract secrets, with power [6] and tim-
ing [7] side-channels being the two most readily exploited [12]. All electronic devices
generate power and timing information during execution. This information is observable
by monitoring the power rail—using relatively pedestrian equipment—to capture execu-
tion emanations [6]. Attackers analyze these captures either directly or using differential
analysis [6] to deduce otherwise secret information. The fundamental issue is that the
power rail provides fine-grain information about security-critical execution.
Existing side-channel defenses focus on the attacker’s signal-to-noise ratio: increas-
ing the noise or decreasing/hiding the signal. Countermeasures include: reducing the
magnitude of side-channel emanations [30], the addition of noise to mask side-channel
emanations [31], obfuscation to hide the relative timing of the secret-revealing emana-
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Figure 3.1: Quantized Computing system overview.
tion [32], and incorporating randomness at the software level [13].
Alternatively, we advocate isolation. Our countermeasure works by performing com-
putation with secret-revealing side-channels in fixed-sized power/time chunks isolated
from the rest of the system—and the attacker. By forcing secure execution into uniform
power/time chunks, we effectively quantize the information revealed by power and tim-
ing side-channels. Thus, our approach provides control over the granularity of attacker-
visible side-channel information. Assuming no secret-dependent execution-differences
span quantized executions, then, from the attacker’s perspective, the power and timing
requirements are uniform and secret-independent. The challenge is to design an isolation
system that eliminates both power and timing side-channels.1 We achieve via a Quanti-
zation Controller: on-chip control logic that sits between a security-critical core and the
rest of the system. As shown in Figure 3.1, the Quantization Controller dictates a secure
1Many techniques for eliminating power side-channels result in increasing the information in timing
side-channels and vice versa [33, 34, 35]. Given that there is no added burden for an attacker capable of
measuring power to measure time, a defense must address both.
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processor’s power source; either from the system’s main power rail—attacker visible—or
from an internal—attacker invisible—energy storage capacitor (by repurposing existing
integrated decoupling capacitors). To ensure uniform (hence secret independent) secure
execution times, the Quantization Controller employs execution-agnostic counters (either
digital or analog). To avoid leaking information during decoupling capacitor recharge, the
Quantization Controller incorporates a discharge circuit to remove any charge remaining
on the decoupling capacitor after secure execution. To protect against thermal fault at-
tacks, we use state versioning to ensure secure computation atomicity [36, 37]. Lastly, to
prevent voltage fault attacks, we add an internal voltage reference.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach and explore its trade-off space, we
implement three Quantization Controllers: a wholly-digital, a hybrid, and a full-custom
variant. For the hybrid and full-custom controllers, we use capacitors and their natural
leakage as execution-independent counters—as opposed to digital logic. All three designs
quantize power and timing to eliminate their respective side-channel leakage, but our
analysis reveals that the hybrid design is preferred due to its compactness and simplicity.
We show that our approach defends against power and timing side-channels in software
implementations of AES and RSA running on an ARM Cortex-m4-based microcontroller
and hardware implementations of AES and RSA on an FPGA. Our evaluation also shows
that existing decoupling capacitors provide ample energy for our defense. Lastly, we
analyze the software run time overheads of real software running on a complete (e.g.,
capacitor powered) prototype of our system.
Quantized Computing makes the following contributions:
• We use execution-independent counters to quantize secure execution time. This
eliminates external fine-grain timing side-channels.
• We replace digital counters with capacitors to protect against thermal faults and
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decrease area and power.
• We leverage on-demand isolation to make side-channel protection a dynamic and
software-level decision.
• We design and implement three variants of our proposed Quantization Controller;
we evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of these implementations against both
software and hardware implementations of AES and RSA.
• We verify our approach with a capacitor-powered prototype that we use to under-
stand the software run time overheads experienced by software that relies on AES
functionality.
3.1 Background
All computing devices generate side-channel emanations as a byproduct of physical im-
plementation and computation [5]. The key to side-channel analysis is the interpretation
of these leaks to reveal secrets. As such, there are many different side- channel leaks
used to capture secrets. These include: power [6], timing [7], electromagnetic [8], acous-
tic [9], memory remanence [10], and thermal [11]. The two most commonly exploited
side-channels in literature are power and timing [12]. The popularity of these two side-
channels is due to the high bit rate and fine-grain (e.g., per clock cycle) information that
they expose to the attacker. To gain access to this wealth of secret-revealing information,
an attacker only needs to be able to measure the current consumed by the victim device.
Given our goal is to counter these side-channels comprehensively and automatically, we
address the following:
• Power Analysis: non-invasive analysis of the power rail during execution to re-
veal unintended leakage through current consumption. Depending on the signal-
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to-noise ratio, attackers employ one of three power analysis techniques (in order
of increasing complexity): Simple Power Analysis (SPA) [6], Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) [6], and High-order Differential Power Analysis (HO-DPA) [38].
SPA is useful when the difference in current due to secure information is large rel-
ative to noise. When the signal is burried in noise, DPA uses statistical analysis
of multiple executions to detect differences. To address cases of extremely small
signal-to-noise ratios, HO-DPA extends DPA by correlating the statistical changes
in multiple variables to uncover secret-dependent current changes. No matter the
power analysis technique used, the measurment system consists of an oscilliscope
and a probe; common equipment, even for university labs.
• Timing Analysis: non-invasive analysis of execution to reveal untended leakage
through response latency or performance. Attackers use timing analysis when an
algorithm or processor has secret-dependent execution time. Possible sources of
timing variation include performance optimization [39], branching and conditional
statements [7], processor instructions [40], RAM [41], and cache hits [42]. The
infrastructure required for timing analysis varies depending on the granularity of the
timing difference in secret-dependent execution. In the most extreme case, timing
analysis requires the same complexity setup as power analysis.
• Fault Attacks: induce faults via unexpected environmental conditions to reveal un-
intended leakage through inconsistent system state. Depending on the target system
there are many ways of inducing faults, including: temperature [43], power [19],
overclocking [44], electromagnetic fields [45], and ionizing radiation [46]. Our
design defends against temperature and power fault attacks since these can have a
targeted effect and are available to a side-channel attacker.
Addressing all three threat vectors at once is a challenging task, but essential for
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true improvements in security. Creating a comprehensive countermeasure is challeng-
ing due to the inherent reciprocal relationship between side-channels. Mitigating one
side-channel in isolation often results in shifting the information to another side- channel.
For example, consider a broken version of our approach that uses only isolation from the
power rail to protect against fine-grain power analysis. This means that secure execution
time—hence the time the crypto core is disconnected from the power rail—is dictated
by secret information. Thus, the attacker sees a square wave on the power rail that di-
vulges the exact execution time of the secure execution. Therefore, we must eliminate
both power and timing side-channels and guard against thermal and power fault attacks.
3.1.1 Decoupling Capacitors
System designers add decoupling capacitors to an Integrated Circuit (IC) to filter out
noise from the power supply. Conceptually, the power supply provides a constant voltage
to the chip. Practically, the highly-variable load caused by different amounts of switching
transistors results in voltage drops as the power supply struggles to supply enough current
to maintain the desired voltage. Making matters worse, power rails are shared by many
ICs on the same Printed Circuit Board (PCB). Large voltage drops cause the IC to have a
power fault; resulting in an inconsistent state or a reset.
To protect against voltage drops, system designers add capacitors between the power
rail and the IC. These capacitors decouple the IC from the power rail, acting as a filter
for power supply noise; when voltage would drop, the decoupling capacitor sources addi-
tional charge to maintain the desired voltage. We leverage the observation that even when
the power rail goes to 0V , the decoupling capacitor supplies enough current to keep the
IC running for a short amount of time.
Traditionally, system designers add decoupling capacitors external to the IC as part of
the PCB layout. Recent advances in IC integration enable adding decoupling capacitors
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inside the IC [47, 48, 49]. Internally-integrated decoupling capacitors have the advantage
of lowering the cost of adding the IC to a PCB, reducing the chance of layout errors, and
providing IC designers quality guarantees about incoming power. We leverage internal
decoupling capacitors to hide current consumption information from an attacker who is
unable to non-destructively interpose between them and the IC.
3.2 Threat Model
Our threat model assumes an attacker with knowledge of the software running on as well
as with full physical access to an IC. The attacker’s objective is to extract secret informa-
tion through non-destructive, non-invasive, timing and power side-channel analysis. We
assume that the attacker can also control the power supplied to the device as well as its
environment to induce power and thermal faults.
On the other hand, we assume that the attacker has no capability to non-destructively
interpose between the crypto core and the Quantization Controller. Traditionally, the ex-
ternal nature of decoupling capacitors made it easy for attackers to interpose by removing
them from the circuit board. With the recent trend of integrated decoupling capacitors,
they are now an integral part of the circuit itself, making interposing destructive. In cases
of nation-state adversaries, it is common to employ anti-tamper techniques to prevent
attackers from non-destructively analyzing the contents of the chip [50].
Following our observation on isolating integrated decoupling capacitors, we develop
a comprehensive and mostly automatic power and timing side-channel defense that is
immune to thermal and power fault attacks.
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3.3 Quantization Controller Design
At the core of our Quantization Controller design is the observation that isolating in-
tegrated decoupling capacitors from the external power rail prevents the attacker from
seeing fine-grain power side-channel information. Unfortunately, isolation alone is insuf-
ficient as coarse-grain information still reveals secrets. To form a comprehensive solution
that addresses power and timing side-channels completely, we layer on top of isolation
components that mask variations in timing and power by ensuring that the power and
time required by secure execution is execution-invariant—from the attacker’s perspec-
tive. Lastly, we address several thermal and power fault attacks created by our approach.
This section details each component of our Quantization Controller.
3.3.1 Isolation Controller
The trend of integrating decoupling capacitors into the Integrated Circuit (IC) enables
our approach. We observe that decoupling capacitors provide enough energy for modern
low-power devices to continue execution for a short period after all power is removed.
This presents an opportunity, because, as our evaluation shows (Section 3.6), decoupling
capacitors provide enough energy to execute popular cryptographic algorithms. As Fig-
ure 3.1 shows, our Isolation Controller uses this opportunity by selectively isolating (in an
electrical sense) a crypto core from the main power rail when it performs secure execution
(i.e., execution that requires protection from power and timing side-channels). During
regular (i.e., insecure) execution, the external power rail continuously provides power to
both the crypto core and the decoupling capacitor; allowing the decoupling capacitor to
charge. Isolation is triggered by the crypto core when it is ready to start secure execu-
tion, allowing the software to balance security guarantees and performance dynamically.
Thus, the Isolation Controller ensures that all fine-grain power and timing side-channel
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information generated by the crypto core is hidden from an attacker with access to the
main power rail and only exposed as coarse-grain information. System designers have
the ability to control the granularity of side-channel information exposed to an attacker
by changing the size of the decoupling capacitor.2
3.3.2 Timing Controller
Although isolating the crypto core from the main power rail eliminates fine-grain power
and timing side-channels, it makes coarse-grain power and timing side-channel informa-
tion more evident to the attacker. One source of coarse-grain side-channel information is
the amount of time required for secure execution; an attacker measures this as the amount
of time the crypto core is isolated from the main power rail. The mitigation for coarse-
grain timing side-channels is computation-invariant secure execution length.
To eliminate coarse-grain timing side-channels, the Quantization Controller includes
a Timing Controller that uses a timer to equalize time spent in secure execution—making
it computation invariant. When the crypto core requests secure execution, the Timing
Controller resets the timer to a seed value. As secure execution occurs, the timer decre-
ments. Once the timer reaches zero, the Timing Controller ends secure execution by
reconnecting to the main power rail. The only constraint is that the secure computation
completes before the timer reaches zero. In Section 3.3.4 we employ data versioning to
address cases where, through fault attacks or poor software design, secure computation
does not complete before reconnecting to the main power rail.
From a high level, the Timing Controller quantizes secure computation into a series
of fixed-time isolated executions. Thus, adding the Timing Controller makes each secure
execution constant time with respect to an attacker.
2Larger decoupling capacitors have benefits beyond enabling longer periods of secure execution in our
approach: larger decoupling capacitors are more effective at filtering power supply noise and are also a
power source for a range of anti-tamper techniques.
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3.3.3 Power Controller
While adding the Timing Controller eliminates coarse-grain timing side-channels, coarse-
grain power side-channels remain. One example of a coarse-grain power side-channel that
isolation creates is the amount of charge required to recharge the decoupling capacitor
once the Timing Controller reconnects to the main power rail. The amount of charge
required for recharge indicates how much energy the crypto core consumed during secure
execution—revealing secret-dependent differences in computation. Uniform-time secure
executions do not mitigate this threat, because, from an energy perspective, they act as a
constant energy expenditure (the idle current times the time of the secure execution) on
top of which a security-dependent delta energy is added.
To eliminate coarse-grain power side-channels, the Quantization Controller includes
a Power Controller that ensures that secure executions are uniform energy from an at-
tacker’s perspective. The Power Controller achieves this by removing any remaining
charge from the decoupling capacitor before reconnecting to the main power rail. We call
this Discharge Mode. To support Discharge Mode, we add a timer to the Timing Con-
troller. Going into secure execution mode is the same, expect both timers are loaded with
their seed value. When the first timer reaches zero, the Timing Controller goes into Dis-
charge Mode, shorting the decoupling capacitor. When the second timer reaches zero, the
Timing Controller goes into Recharge Mode by connecting the decoupling capacitor to
the main power rail. The difference in seed values between the two timers must guarantee
that there is enough time to completely discharge the decoupling capacitor.
Adding the Power Controller makes our secure execution both uniform in time and
power with respect to an attacker.
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3.3.4 Fault Attacks
Although the goal of our design is to eliminate power and timing side-channels, we realize
that our defense also defeats power-based fault attacks, as well as creating a range of new
attacks based on injecting faults around secure execution. Thus, our design also addresses
a range of fault attacks: Power [19], Memory [20], and Thermal [11].
By isolating secure execution from the main power rail, the Quantization Controller
prevents fault attacks induced through power glitching during secure execution. Power
glitching attacks result in a range of malicious effects: instruction failing [51], instruction
skipping [52], propagation delays [53], and clock skewing [19]. Power faults require the
attacker to have direct control over the crypto core’s power source during secure execu-
tion. Typically, attackers reduce the voltage dramatically and for a short duration; this po-
tentially skips individual or a range of instructions. This technique is useful for skipping
loop iterations or security-critical checks. In addition to effecting instruction execution
directly, power fluctuations can also effect execution indirectly through clock frequency
manipulation. Decreasing the supply voltage reduces the drive strength of transistors;
resulting in increased signal transition times. By decreasing supply voltage enough, at-
tackers can cause the signal propagation delay to be longer than a clock cycle. This causes
subtle execution errors. By powering the crypto core using an internal power supply (i.e.,
integrated decoupling capacitor), our approach eliminates any direct infulence of the at-
tacker over the power rail.
Though isolation addresses power-based fault attacks during secure execution, our
approach (up to this point) enables power-based fault attacks outside of secure execution.
Attackers can manipulate the power source before secure execution starts, allowing them
to control the amount of energy stored in the decoupling capacitors. Through this control,
attackers can cause power to run out before secure execution completes. The timing of
power loss and the intermediate software state exposes secrets. Another threat is that
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the crypto core assumes that secure execution completed and uses incomplete results
for future computation. For example, with the Chinese Remainder Theorem should an
attacker compromises either prime number p or q, the other prime is extractable [54].
Algorithm 1 Secure Mode
Input: Mode, Vref
Effect: Isolated Execution
1: if Mode == SECURE then
2: if Vref == OKAY then
3: Isolate = 1 // Isolate internal power rail
4: Recharge Timer = 0 // Initialize timer
5: Discharge Timer = 0 // Initialize timer
6: ...Isolated Secure Execution...
7: ...Commit results to non-volatile memory...
8: else
9: // attempted undervolt attack
10: Isolate = 1 // Isolate internal power rail
11: Discharge = 1 // Activate discharge circuit
12: end if
13: end if
To address fault attacks that leverage premature, unexpected, secure execution termi-
nation, we implement state versioning. With state versioning, the crypto core prepares
a temporary state that it operates on during secure execution. The last action of secure
execution is a commit of the temporary state to a permanent state by a writing to a flag
variable that software reads when resuming execution after secure execution. In the event
of incomplete secure execution, software sees that the flag was not updated and retries se-
cure execution. By doing this, state versioning provides to software the notion of secure
execution-level atomicity.
Unfortunately, this creates another potential side-channel as the attacker can use the
lack of forward progress and their control over the voltage of the main power rail to
systematically identify how much charge (as voltage across the decoupling capacitor) is
required for the crypto core to complete and commit secure computation. To eliminate
this threat, we add an internal reference voltage circuit (Vref in Figure 3.1). When the
crypto core signals to start a secure execution, the Timing Controller checks the internal
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reference voltage to ensure that the attacker has not been undervolting the main power
rail. In the event of attack, Discharge Mode is started to reset the core. From a high level,
Vref guarentees that there is enough charge stored in the decoupling capacitor to start
secure execution by bounding the attacker’s influence over the initial energy stored in the
decoupling capacitor.
Another mechanism—albeit coarse-grain—for inducing premature termination of se-
cure execution is a thermal attack. Observe that digital circuits (i.e., the Quantization
Controller’s timers3) are mostly immune to thermal variation, while analog circuits (i.e.,
the decoupling capacitors) are not. By increasing temperature in a targeted way, an at-
tacker increases the power requirement of the crypto core and the natural leakage of the
decoupling capacitor [43]; the digital counters used for controlling the time of secure ex-
ecution are unaffected. This results in power loss before software completes its secure
execution. State versioning protects against premature power loss.
Freezing attacks on digital counters also possible. Attackers can desynchronize the
timing between the secure execution and our timers. Replacing digital timers with leakage-
based capacitor timers allows our timers to be affected in the same way as the power
capacitor. Freezing either hybrid or analog designs causes all three capacitors to change
in the same way—maintaing the expected ordering of events.
Algorithm 2 Discharge Mode
Input: Discharge Timer
Effect: Uniform Power
1: if Discharge Timer == CONSTANTD then
2: Discharge = 1 // Activate discharge circuit
3: ...Short-circuit decoupling capacitor...
4: end if
3In Section 3.4.3, we present the idea of using capacitors for time tracking due to their compactness and
consistency in behavior to decoupling capacitors given thermal fault attacks.
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Algorithm 3 Recharge Mode
Input: Recharge Timer
Effect: Uniform Time
1: if Recharge Timer == CONSTANTR then
2: Isolate = 0 // Connect to main power rail
3: Discharge = 0 // Disable discharge circuit
4: ...Insecure execution...
5: end if
3.3.5 End-to-end Flow
Previous sections discuss the individual components that comprise our approach, now
we describe how they work together to form our Quantization Controller. From a high
level, the Quantization Controller operates in one of three modes: Secure Mode (Al-
gorithm 1), Discharge Mode (Algorithm 2), and Recharge Mode (Algorithm 3).
The system powers-on in Recharge Mode where non-security-critical computation
occurs and the decoupling capacitor charges in preparation for the next secure execu-
tion. The Isolation Controller connects the decoupling capacitor to the main
power rail and the Power Controller disconnects the shorting circuit. This is the
only time where the attacker has access to fine-grain power and timing side-channel in-
formation. When the crypto core signals, through Mode, that it needs to execute se-
curely, the Timing Controller resets both timers and commands the Isolation
Controller to disconnect from the main power rail. After a secure-computation-
invariant amount of time passes, Discharge Timer fires. This causes the Power
Controller to connect the decoupling capacitor to the shorting circuit to remove all
charge. Finally, after additional secure computation-invariant time, Recharge Timer
fires, causing a return to Recharge Mode.
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Figure 3.2: Illustrative of the Quantization Controller’s effectiveness against power and timing
side-channels for RSA. Note that the noise/variation is hard to see due to scaling.
3.3.6 Illustrative Example
To illustrate the impact our design has on an side-channel attacker, we compare two runs
of RSA: one unprotected and one protected by the Quantization Controller. As the shown
in Figure 3.2, for the unprotected case, when a key bit is 1, RSA executes modular expo-
nentiation, which consumes more time and current than a 0 bit. This enables an attacker
to extrapolate the key based on both power and timing side-channels. Portions of the trace
shown in red represent when the attacker gains meaningful information and portions in
blue represent when the attacker sees only noise from the main power rail. The span be-
tween vertical lines represents the time required by that round of RSA. Notice how each
round in the protected case is uniform in length, while it is secret-dependent in the un-
protected case. Also notice, that even though there is current information available to the
attacker during recharge, recharge always starts with the same current (i.e., the decoupling
capacitor is at the same voltage at the start of Recharge Mode). Thus the Quantization
Controller eliminates power and timing side-channels.
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3.4 Quantization Controller Implementation
As Figure 3.1 shows, we implement the Quantization Controller in hardware, as a part
of an existing crypto core’s Integrated Circuit (IC). The Quantization Controller inter-
poses between the main power rail (attacker visible) and the internal power rail (attacker
invisible). This allows the Quantization Controller to control when power side-channel
information is exposed. In addition to the input from the main power rail, the Quantiza-
tion Controller takes a one wire input from the crypto core. This wire carries the Mode
information used by the Quantization Controller in Algorithm 1 to determine when to
start secure execution. Lastly, the Quantization Controller includes a power output used
to connect the integrated decoupling capacitor to the discharging circuit. These connec-
tions enable the Quantization Controller to eliminate power and timing side-channels, for
arbitrary crypto cores, on-demand.
The Quantization Controller consists of three sub-controllers: timing, isolation, and
power. The Timing Controller ensures that secure execution takes a secret-independent
amount of time, the Isolation Controllermanages isolation from the main power
rail, and the Power Controller ensures that secure execution takes a secret-independent
amount of energy. From a high level, these controllers are a combination of counters and
switches. From a low level, we describe three implementation strategies: wholly digital,
full-custom analog, and a hybrid design. A driving observation of our implementations
is that capacitors act as area-efficient counters. We validate each implementation using
a combination of Register Transfer Level (RTL) simulation (for digital logic) and Sim-
ulation Program for Integrated Circuits Emphasis (SPICE) simulations (for analog cir-
cuits). While each implementation strategy eliminates power and timing side-channels,
they present tradeoffs in terms of complexity and hardware overheads. Table 3.1 details
the tradeoff space between the three variants.
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Wholly Digital Analog Hybrid
Cells 105 3 5
Area 221 8 14
Lines HDL 65 0 29
Design Effort low high low
Integration Effort low high medium
Table 3.1: Tradeoff space of the three Quantization Controller implementations using a 22nm
process technology.
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Figure 3.3: RTL simulation of the wholly digital and hybrid versions.
3.4.1 Wholly Digital Implementation
The wholly digital implementation of the Quantization Controller uses only digital logic
to create the required counters and switches. The advantages of using only digital logic
are that it is much easier to design and tune compared to using analog components and it
is easier for hardware designers to integrate into their designs. The disadvantages are that
digital logic requires logic to save and update potentially large counters and using digital
counters to track time presents the opportunity for an attacker to use thermal fault attacks
to invert the expected relationship between the timing of power running out and secure
execution completing.
Figure 3.3 shows our RTL-level validation of the wholly digital Quantization Con-
troller. The Quantization Controller powers-on in Recharge Mode. Eventually the
crypto core triggers Secure Mode by driving Mode to 1. This causes the Isolation
Controller to disconnect the crypto core from the main power rail, isolating it. Even-
tually software completes its security-critical computation. At a later—secret-invariant—
time, the Timing Controller signals to the Power Controller to go to Discharge
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Figure 3.4: Full-custom analog Quantization Controller circuit.
Mode. The Power Controller connects the decoupling capacitor to the short-circuit,
draining all energy. After additional secret-invariant time, the Timing Controller
signals to the Isolation Controller to return to Recharge Mode.4
3.4.2 Analog Implementation
Figure 3.4 shows our full-custom analog Quantization Controller implementation. An
analog implementation enables two optimizations not possible in the digital implementa-
tion. First, we replace expensive digital counters with capacitors (C2 and C3) to control
our PMOS recharge (M1) and discharge (M2) switches directly. The observation that
makes this possible is that the natural leakage of capacitors creates a countdown effect,
albeit in the analog domain. When the capacitor’s voltage is feed to PMOS logic, there is
a voltage where the digital value changes from 1 to 0. We treat this event as the counter
firing. This enables us to replace hundreds of logic gates required by digital counters with
two capacitors.5 Beyond their compactness, capacitor-based counters have an advantage
4There is no need for a counter to determine how long to stay in recharge mode because software
controls that transition. This avoids adding unnecessary overhead when security is not required and reduces
Quantization Controller complexity. A pull-down resistor ensures that Mode wire defaults to 0V (aka
insecure execution).
5We do not add capacitors; because our capacitor-based counters only need to track small amounts
of time and only lose energy due to leakage, their capacitance values are very small. To implement our
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Figure 3.5: SPICE simulation of the full-custom analog version.
in that they encode a relative notion of time with respect to each other and the decoupling
capacitor—a critical property given temperature-based fault attacks.
The second optimization made possible by our analog implementation is we use Mode
from the crypto core to control directly our timing counter. When the crypto core initiates
secure mode by driving Mode to 1, this powers the recharge counter (C2). When the
discharge counter (C3) fires, it short-circuits the decoupling capacitor (C1), that in-turn
browns out the crypto core. This causes Mode to return to its default value of 0. This
causes the recharge counter (C2)to start (via leakage). This optimization reduces the size
of both the recharge and discharge counters by having them run sequentially as opposed
to concurrently.
The tradeoff with these optimizations is increased design and integration complexity.
Since the counter capacitors are directly controlling the switching PMOS logic, they do
not switch instantly but gradually as the capacitor continues to discharge. Thus, hard-
ware designers must simulate the analog domain switching behavior to ensure correct
operation.
Figure 3.5 shows our SPICE simulation-based validation of the full-custom analog
Quantization Controller. The crypto core starts executing in a continuously-powered
fashion, with side-channels exposed. This mode, while insecure, allows the decoupling
capacitor-based counters we vary the implementation of transistors and the wires used to connect them [55].
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Figure 3.6: SPICE simulation of the analog parts of the hybrid version.
capacitor (C1), recharge counter (C2), and the discharge counter (C3) to charge. The
crypto core then signals to the Isolation Controller that it wants to perform
security-critical computation by driving Mode to 1. This disconnects the decoupling
capacitor from the main power rail—isolating the crypto core from the attacker. Now
disconnected, the decoupling capacitor begins to discharge due to crypto core compu-
tation and leakage. Eventually enough charge dissipates from the decoupling capaci-
tor such that the processor browns out due to insufficient voltage. After enough secret-
invariant leakage of the discharge counter capacitor, the Power Controller is trig-
gered shorting the decoupling capacitor, ensuring that the amount of energy required for
recharge is secret-invariant.6 At a later time, dictated by the recharge counter capacitor’s
leakage, the Power Controller disconnects the short circuit and the Isolation
Controller reconnects to the main power rail. No matter the load used to simulate
secure execution, all events except the time the discharge trigger (which is not attacker
observable) and the recharge trigger occur at the same time and all capacitors have con-
sistent charge times when reconnected.
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3.4.3 Hybrid Implementation
Incorporating most of the benefits of the reduced complexity and ease of integration of
the digital implementation and the compact and thermal fault resistant capacitor-based
counters of the analog implementation is our hybrid implementation. As Table 3.1 shows,
by replacing the digital counters with capacitors, the hybrid implementation approaches
the minimal area of the heavily-optimized analog implementation, without having to deal
with analog circuit behavior. What is not shown is the complexity of the implementation.
By replacing the counters with capacitors, the hybrid implementation reduces the amount
of HDL code as well: from 65 lines for the wholly-digital implementation to 29. The
disadvantage of the hybrid implementation compared to the digital implementation is the
added burden on the hardware designer to create appropriately sized capacitors as part of
their IC design.
Figure 3.6 shows the SPICE simulation of the hybrid implementation. Unlike the ana-
log implementation’s SPICE simulation (Figure 3.5), the transitions between states are in-
stantaneous. This is evident when the discharge and recharge timer capacitors trigger the
Power Controller and the Timing Controller, respectively. The decoupling
capacitor is discharged instantly and starts recharging instantly for the hybrid simulation,
while gradually discharging and recharging in the analog simulation. The instantaneous
transitions obviate the need for analog domain simulation (e.g., SPICE).
3.5 Selecting a Crypto Core
With the design and implementation of the Quantization Controller set, the next step is
to incorporate it into a real system. There are two benefits to this: (1) understanding how
6Had the decoupling capacitor not been shorted, it would have continued to discharge as indicated by
the unshorted power rail.
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crypto core properties affect Quantization Controller performance and (2) to show that
our Quantization Controller is effective at eliminating power and timing side-channels.
The first step of a full-system implementation is deciding cryptographic exemplars.
AES [56] and RSA [57] are ideal examples: (1) they are two of the most popular crypto-
graphic algorithms in use today; (2) both have known power [58, 59] and timing [60, 7]
side-channel vulnerabilities; and (3) from a benchmarking perspective, AES and RSA ex-
plore complementary aspects of system performance. AES is memory bound as it relies
on many table look-ups and simple computation. Alternatively, RSA is compute bound
as it relies on complex modular exponentiation on register values. For these reasons, we
base our full-system implementation and evaluation on 128-bit AES and 64-bit RSA exe-
cutions. We avoid longer keys because it is unlikely that integrated decoupling capacitors
for the foreseeable future will be able to support them in a single secure execution and the
trends shown for shorter keys are true for longer keys.
Both AES and RSA are implementable as software running on a processor or as hard-
ware accelerators. Given that our approach is agnostic to whether the crypto core is a
general-purpose processor that runs cryptographic algorithms or a hardware accelerator,
we focus on software implementations of AES and RSA.
3.5.1 Capacitor Bank
The centerpiece of our approach is the decoupling capacitor. Our approach works only
when the decoupling capacitor is able to provide enough charge to complete meaningful
security-critical computation (i.e., all secret-dependent execution differences converge).
Thus, when evaluating system design options it is essential to base the evaluation on
maximizing the amount of computation possible given the size of existing integrated
decoupling capacitors. To this end, we derive an equation for calculating the required
capacitance based on features of the crypto core and secure execution.
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Capacitance (C) depends on charge (Q) and voltage (V ).
C =
Q
V
(3.1)
The total amount of charge (Q) is given by multiplying average current (I) by the length
of computation (∆t).
C =
I∆t
V
(3.2)
Since most devices do not use all the charge held by the capacitor (because they fail
to operate below some non-zero voltage), we replace the voltage (V ) with a value that
accounts for the operational voltage range of the crypto core (∆V ).
C =
I∆t
∆V
(3.3)
Equation 3.3 defines the relationship between average current, voltage range, and
computation time for a capacitor. By plugging the crypto core and secure computation
measurements into Equation 3.3, we can solve for the capacitance required for secure ex-
ecution. Since the goal is to minimize the capacitor required for a unit of computation,
system design decisions should focus on minimizing the average current and total time of
that computation, while maximizing the operating voltage range of the device performing
the computation.
3.5.2 Preliminaries
One way to implement cryptographic algorithms is as software running on a general-
purpose processor. Software implementations, while being slower than hardware imple-
mentations, are updateable, have the ability to support a variety of algorithms, as well as
allowing the processor to run a larger application with non-security-critical functionality.
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Given software implementations of AES and RSA, this sections explores the impact on
required capacitor size given key processor properties. We divide the discussion into two
parts, one focused on computation and another focused on memory. For each part, we
relate processor properties to the effect they have on each term on the right hand side of
Equation 3.3.
To explore the trade-space of processor properties, we analyze AES and RSA software
implementations on three microcontrollers. We select the three microcontrollers based
on their popularity and their coverage of the microcontroller design space.7 Table 3.2
provides a summary of our findings for each microcontroller. Remember that the goal is
to maximize the amount of computation that can fit within the range of existing embedded
processor decoupling capacitors.
3.5.3 Computation Effects
3.5.3.1 Computation Time (∆t)
Reducing the time required to perform a given security-critical computation (∆t) reduces
the numerator in Equation 3.3, resulting in a smaller capacitor (C). The two most sig-
nificant properties of a microcontroller that dictate how long a given computation takes
are the maximum clock frequency (Max clk) and microcontroller performance (ISA Effi-
ciency). Multiplying these two values provides a measure of peak performance. Further,
any secure computation can be expressed as a worst-case number of instructions, and
dividing this value by the peak performance reveals an estimate for ∆t.
Maximum clock frequency is a product of several hardware design decisions, in-
cluding, process technology, targeted deployments, and micro-architectural complexity.
Sub-32-bit microcontrollers focus on cost where 32-bit microcontrollers focus on perfor-
7We focus on microcontrollers as opposed to desktop or mobile processors because current and future
decoupling capacitors are not able to provide enough energy for such high-power processors to execute.
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Processor AT32UC3L064 MSP432P401R MSP430FR6989
Max CPU clk
MHz 50 48 16
ISA
bit width 32 32 16
ISA Efficiency
DMIPS/MHz 1.28 1.20 0.288
Voltage Range
V 1.62 - 3.6 1.62 - 3.7 1.8 - 3.6
Power Efficiency
µAmps/MHz 165 80 100
NV-Mem
Type Flash Flash FRAM
NV-Mem write time
µs/64B (AES) 88.4 66.8
NV-Mem write current
µA @ 64B (AES) 4.07 2.14
NV-Mem write time
µs/32B (RSA) 66.9 31.2
NV-Mem write current
µA @ 32B (RSA) 3.97 2.11
Table 3.2: Summary of key properties of the processors evaluated.
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mance, power, and size. By focusing on cost, sub-32-bit microcontrollers tend to tar-
get toys and bare-bones appliances that have very low performance requirements. The
primary way to reduce cost is to fabricate the microcontroller using larger and slower
transistors (i.e., an older process node). This reduces the maximum clock frequency. An-
other reason for reduced clock frequency is the number of pipeline stages; the MSP430
is unpipelined [61] while the UC3L0 [62] and the MSP432 [63] have three stage pipeline
stages. Pipelining increases the maximum frequency while also increasing development
costs and current consumption.
Microcontroller performance, on the other hand, is dictated by instruction set design
and word-width. Instruction set design dictates how many instructions it takes to execute
a given cryptographic operation. For example, RSA relies on modular arithmetic. Un-
fortunately, implementing a modulus operation on the MSP430 is expensive because it
does not have a modulus instruction. The UC3L0 and the MSP432 do, making them have
to execute fewer instructions to perform one round of RSA. A second consideration—
especially for cryptographic algorithms that deal with large numbers—is the word width
of the microcontroller. The UC3L0 and MSP432 have twice the word size of the MSP430,
thus they have roughly twice the throughput when working with large data words.
Plugging in the numbers from Table 3.2 into Equation 3.3 shows that both the UC3L0
and MSP432 are the best options for reducing computation time (∆t). In the case of
our three processors, there is a correlation between maximum clock frequency and ISA
efficiency that makes peak performance differences more exaggerated than individual
property differences. Thus, keeping all variables besides ∆t in Equation 3.3 equal, the
MSP432 and the MSP430 require an 11% and 1289% larger capacitor compared to the
UC3L0, respectively.
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3.5.3.2 Average Current (I)
Reducing the average current (I) reduces the numerator in Equation 3.3, resulting in a
smaller capacitor (C). The current consumption of the crypto core dictates the rate at
which charge is used from the capacitor. To approximate the average current of each
microcontroller, we multiply the Power Efficiency and the Max CPU clk in Table 3.2. This
number tells us the expected current for the clock frequency that minimizes computation
time (∆t) for a given secure computation.
Notice that both the computation time (∆t) and average current calculations use Max
CPU clk, but one as a divider and one as a multiplier. Given this, the way to reduce av-
erage current—without increasing computation time—is to increase the power efficiency
of the microcontroller. There are two ways hardware designers accomplish this: move
to a smaller process node and/or power/clock gate the design. A smaller process node
reduces the current required to switch transistors (although it increases the static current).
Clock gating prevents transistors from switching when their results are not needed. Fi-
nally, power gating removes both static and dynamic current consumption of transistors
that are not needed.
The MSP432, being newer, uses a more recent process node than the other two. The
designers of the MSP432 also focus more power gating to reduce current consumption.
Even though that makes it the most power efficient, the MSP430 actually has the lowest
peak current. This is mainly due to its low Max CPU clk. Plugging the average currents
into Equation 3.3, keeping all other variables equal, the UC3L0 and the MSP432 require
a 416% and 140% larger capacitor compared to the MSP430, respectively.
3.5.3.3 Voltage Range (∆V )
Increasing the operating voltage range of the crypto core (∆V ) increases the denominator
in Equation 3.3, resulting in a smaller capacitance (C). To better understand why this is
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the case, recall that the amount capacitance is fixed, therefore as a capacitor loses charge
(through leakage or by powering computation), the voltage across the capacitor decreases
(Equation 3.1). Unfortunately, as voltage decreases, digital components begin to act as
analog components, causing them to fail. Given that this failure occurs when there is
a non-zero voltage across the capacitor, the capacitor still holds charge. This charge
is wasted. Thus, we can only consider the amount of charge that covers the operating
voltage range of the core when sizing the capacitor; wider voltage ranges are better.
For microcontrollers, the primary factor influencing voltage range is the internal volt-
age regulator. Voltage regulator options are common across microcontrollers; meaning
all three microcontrollers have similar voltage ranges. Thus, the UC3L0 and the MSP430
require a 5% and 16% larger capacitor than the MSP432, respectively.
3.5.3.4 Summary
When considering only the effects of computation, the MSP432 is the preferred micro-
controller; the UC3L0 requires a capacitor twice as large, while the MSP430 requires a
capacitor six times as large.
3.5.4 Memory Effects
After secure computation completes, the crypto core must commit results to non-volatile
memory before it loses power and all volatile state disappears. Depending on non-volatile
memory technology, this can require as much charge as the computation itself. Thus, in
this section we explore non-volatile memory technology’s impact on capacitor size.
The microcontrollers we evaluate offer either Flash or FRAM non-volatile memory.
Flash is the industry standard, while FRAM is a newcomer targeted at ultra-lower-power
and energy harvesting devices. FRAM advantages include lower power, single cycle
writes. Alternatively, Flash comes in larger sizes and services reads at three times the
56
frequency. Given that both the MSP432 and the UC3L0 use Flash, but the MSP432 has
a lower compute cost, this section compares the Flash on the MSP432 against the FRAM
on the MSP430.
3.5.4.1 Write Time (∆t)
Write time is the most significant factor that differentiates FRAM and Flash. Writing to
FRAM requires changing the polarity of a magnetic field. This is possible at low current
and low voltage [64]. On the other hand, writes to Flash require much more time because
they must collect enough current to create a high enough voltage to force charge across
a dielectric. The Flash controller must then hold this high voltage for enough time for
sufficient charge to flow to change the cell’s state.
Normally, every write to Flash memory incurs this waiting time. Fortunately, the
MSP432 includes an optimization that allows software to write to Flash in 16 byte bursts,
up to four at a time. Doing this amortizes a single waiting time across many contiguous
writes. Figure 3.7 shows the impact of this optimization.8 From a high level, the abil-
ity to amortize the writes to Flash significantly impacts software and how the MSP432
compares to the MSP430. From a microcontroller comparison perspective, Flash is pro-
hibitively expensive when committing state in anything other than multiples of 16-bytes.
Thus, software may need to incorporate padding to leverage 16-byte bursts. For example,
AES requires 32 bytes for intermediate results and 1 bit for version tracking. To minimize
write time we add padding to fill up 48-bytes.
Another takeaway from Figure 3.7 is that increases in clock frequency do little to
hasten Flash writes. This is because the time spent waiting for the write to complete far
exceeds the time spent moving data between buffers. A similar trend exists for FRAM,
8Notice that even though the burst size is 16-bytes, Figure 3.7 shows that there is no speed-up for 16
bytes. We identified a bug in TI’s Flash driver when it checks the size of the write to see if it can use a burst
write: a< is used instead of a<=. This causes bursts to work for multiples of 16 bytes, but not for a single
16-byte burst.
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Figure 3.7: Time required to write to Flash and FRAM.
but the critical frequency is 8MHz as that is the maximum frequency of FRAM.
Plugging the write times from Table 3.2 into Equation 3.3, keeping all other variables
equal, writing to the Flash memory on the MSP432 requires a 32% and 114% larger
capacitor for AES and RSA compared to the MSP430, respectively.
3.5.4.2 Average Current (I)
While the current required by Flash and FRAM is similar for read operations, write cur-
rents are much higher for Flash. Writing values to Flash memory involves flipping 1 bits
to 0 bits, as appropriate. Flipping a 1 to a 0 requires a high enough voltage to force charge
to flow across a dielectric; this voltage is much higher than the chip’s supply voltage. To
create a sufficiently high voltage, the Flash controller uses a charge pump to essentially
convert high current into high voltage.
Table 3.2 shows the average Flash and FRAM write currents for a range of write
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sizes. The results show that writing to FRAM requires similar current to performing
computation, while writing to Flash almost doubles the current required compared to
computation. Plugging the average currents into Equation 3.3, keeping all other variables
equal, writing to the Flash memory on the MSP432 requires up to a 278% larger capacitor
compared to the MSP430.
3.5.4.3 Voltage Range (∆V )
The crypto core must commit the results of secure computation to non-volatile memory at
the end of that secure computation—otherwise, the results will be lost when power cycles.
In the case of microcontrollers, they include brown out circuitry that ensures that if it is
on, voltage is sufficient to write to non-volatile memory. Thus, the operating voltage
range for memory is the same as it is for computation.
3.5.4.4 Summary
When considering only the effects of non-volatile memory accesses, the MSP430 is the
preferred microcontroller; depending on the amount of data that software needs to commit
at the end of secure computation, the MSP432 requires between 118% and 249% as large
of a capacitor as the MSP430.
3.5.5 Analysis and Recommendations
The MSP432 is better for compute-limited secure computation, but the MSP430 is bet-
ter for memory-limited secure computation. This is a trade space that system design-
ers can exploit when selecting a microcontroller for Quantized Computing deployments.
Combining our analyses into a single equation reveals that when the secure computation
spends 70% of its time writing to Flash memory, it is best to move to an FRAM-based mi-
crocontroller. For future Quantized Computing deployments, we recommend augmenting
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Figure 3.8: Quantization Controller MSP432 prototype.
the MSP432 with a small (e.g., 128 byte) FRAM scratch pad that secure computation can
use to commit results before power loss. Given that neither AES or RSA approach 70%
of their time spent writing to Flash, we select the MSP432.
3.6 Selecting a Microcontroller Configuration
The MSP432 supports a range of configuration options that impact duration of secure
computation (∆t) and current consumption (I). To explore the impact of these configu-
ration options, we create a prototype of the Quantization Controller with the MSP432 as
the crypto core. Using this platform, we run AES and RSA. The goal is to discover the
configuration settings that minimize the required capacitor.
Figure 3.8 shows our prototype. The prototype is split into three components: a Xilinx
Artix-35T FPGA, a collection of discrete circuit components, and a MSP432 development
board. The FPGA implements the digital logic of our Quantization Controller, the discrete
60
circuit components implement the analog aspects of the Quantization Controller (i.e.,
the switches, decoupling capacitors, and timing capacitors), and the MSP432 acts as the
crypto core.
Using this platform, we evaluate all centered clock frequencies of the MSP432: 1.5MHz,
3MHz, 6MHz, 12MHz, 24MHz, and 48MHz.9 We only present the three highest frequen-
cies as lower frequencies disproportionately sacrifice computation time for reduce current.
Also, we evaluate two different 24MHz configurations [63]: with and without a memory
wait state. Adding a wait state decreases memory throughput, but allows for lower cur-
rent operation. Because the MSP432 uses a read buffer that leverages access locality, the
impact of wait states is program dependent.
To capture an upper bound on computation time and current, we use worst case inputs
for AES and RSA. Evaluating under the worst case inputs ensures that we are evaluating
the secure algorithms under there highest energy usage, yielding a worst case capacitor
size. For example, RSA modular exponentiation only executes when a key bit is 1, which
consumes more power and time. Thus, to guarantee that we capture worst case behavior,
we use a key of all 1’s.
To minimize the influence of noise on our results we average 10 trails. Averaging 10
trails results in a relative standard deviation of 5.61% for current and 0.04% for compu-
tation time. Another tool that we use to reduce measurement noise is a differential probe
that eliminates common mode noise.
3.6.1 Computation Time (∆t)
To determine the effect that clock frequency has on computation time, we record the
computation time of all possible sizes of secure computation (i.e., 1 through 12 rounds
9Centered frequencies are the coarse-grain clock frequencies supported by the MSP432; i.e., operational
set points.
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Figure 3.10: Computation time for RSA
62
per secure execution for AES and 1 through 64 rounds per secure execution for RSA) at
every frequency and wait state configuration. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the results of this
experiment for AES and RSA, respectively. When comparing computation times, RSA
takes approximately double the computation time of AES due to its modular arithmetic.
For example, 12 rounds of AES take as long as 32 rounds of RSA.
As expected, there is a linear relationship between the number of rounds per secure
execution and the computation time. The same is not true for clock frequency: doubling
the clock frequency from 12MHz to 24MHz results in a 50% reduction in time. However,
doubling from 24MHz to 48MHz results in only a 33% reduction. This non-linearity is
due to memory pressure stemming from the 24MHz limit on Flash reads. This is why the
memory-bound AES shows less improvement when moving to 48MHz than the compute-
bound RSA.
3.6.2 Average Current (I)
Similarly, Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the current results for AES and RSA, respectively.
The results suggest that current largely depends on clock frequency, as opposed to soft-
ware. Software does have a small impact, as RSA generally has a low current—even
though its computation takes longer. AES’s slightly higher current is due to increased
memory accesses that require more current than computation from registers. Current ap-
pears proportional to clock frequency. However, the current offset does not scale with
the clock frequency, there is a 30% increase when going from 12MHz to 24MHz, but a
65% increase when going from 24MHz to 48MHz. There is also 7% variation with and
without a wait state at 24MHz for AES compared to a minimal difference for RSA. AES,
being memory-bound, benefits more from the read-buffer than RSA, lowering its current.
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Figure 3.11: Average current for AES
4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64
Rounds/Secure Execution
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Av
er
ag
e 
Cu
rre
nt
 (m
A)
48 MHz
24_0WS MHz
24_1WS MHz
12 MHz
Figure 3.12: Average current for RSA
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3.6.3 Capacitor Size
With computation time and current tradeoffs measured, we use Equation 3.3 to determine
their combined effect on required decoupling capacitor size. Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show
the required capacitor size of AES and RSA, respectively. The best clock frequency is
24MHz with zero memory wait states, since that is the best option for RSA and among
the best for AES. To put these results into context, the MSP432 that we use has 400nF of
decoupling capacitors. This allows for 5 rounds of AES and 25 rounds of RSA per secure
execution.
3.6.4 System Verification
To validate our system we show the effectiveness of our Quantization Controller in elim-
inating both power and timing side-channel leakage by leveraging the MSP432’s exist-
ing decoupling capacitors to produce uniform power and timing footprints for secure
execution. We conduct the system verification using the prototype in Figure 3.8 with a
hybrid Quantization Controller, an MSP432 running at 24MHz and 0 wait states, the ex-
isting 400nF decoupling capacitor, using AES (5 rounds per secure execution) and RSA
(25 rounds per secure execution) implementations vulnerable to power and timing side-
channel attacks (which we verify using our measurement setup). Our validation shows
that both power and timing side- channels are eliminated by the Quantization Controller
and that both AES and RSA complete across several secure executions.
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Figure 3.15: Software run time overhead across a range of secure execution invocaton rates.
3.6.5 Software Overhead
An important feature the Quantization Controller is the ability to protect software on-
demand. When operating in recharge mode, there is no protection, but also no cost. This
allows software designers to reason about security guarantees and run time overhead due
to protection. To explore this trade space afforded by the Quantization Controller, we
explore how software’s run time overhead changes as the frequency of secure executions
decreases (i.e., more time spent on non-security-critical computation). Figure 3.15 shows
the results.
The overhead of our design using both AES and RSA follow similar patterns with an
offset. The offset comes from two differences between AES and RSA: (1) RSA rounds
are more fine grain and easier to tightly pack in a secure execution and (2) RSA spends
less time writing to Flash since it has to write half the date. One option system designers
might explore is increasing decoupling capacitor size (as shown in 600nF lines). While
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this does reduce overhead, finding ways to reduce the rate of secure executions is much
more effective and easier since it is a software change.
3.7 Discussion
Given that our design eliminates power and timing side-channel leakage while also ad-
dressing a range of fault attacks, advanced attackers are forced to use more complex and
expensive techniques to capture side-channel information. One such technique is exploit-
ing Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel leakage. EM side-channel attacks are similar to
power side-channel attacks in that they both extract power information [12]. The tradeoff
is between fidelity and access: where power side-channel attacks use low cost probes [65]
that attach directly to the power rail, providing direct access to changes in current, EM
side-channel attacks use expensive probes [66] placed above sensitive locations on the
IC, indirectly measuring changes in current via the radiating electromagnetic field. The
challenge with EM side-channel attacks is extracting the desired signal from the noise as
all wires in a system that carry current contribute to the EM field [67, 68].
While our approach is not intended to deal with EM attacks, it does make them more
challenging. When the Quantization Controller isolates the crypto core for secure execu-
tion, it dramatically shortens the wires in the IC that carry the bulk of the current. This
makes them a less effective antenna, reducing the signal the attacker is able to capture.
While this reduces EM radiation, it does not remove it with respect to a nation-state level
attacker. Fortunately, effective IC-level countermeasures against EM emanations exist.
These include shielding [69] and adding power and ground planes [70].
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3.8 Related Work
Quantized Computing is an on-demand, automatic, practical, and comprehensive defense
against power, timing, and fault attacks. Our approach centers on isolation, which di-
verges from traditional defenses to power and timing side-channel attacks: traditional
defenses play the signal-to-noise ratio game focusing on eliminating, reducing, hiding, or
adding noise to mask the signal.
Resdesigning cryptographic circuits to consume uniform (i.e., independent of data)
energy eliminates power side-channels [6, 71, 72]. Balanced based signal reduction cir-
cuits have been achieved by focusing on dual-rail precharge logic [73, 74, 75], current
modes [76, 77], and asynchronous logic styles [78, 79]. Other techniques include com-
pensating circuitry and physical shielding [80, 81]. While such approaches are effective
against power, they are not comprhensive (timing and fault attacks remain). Addition-
aly, they require significant hardware redesign while dramatically increasing hardware’s
power and area.
Other approaches focus on increasing noise in hopes of masking the signal [82]. Noise
is added by circuits that consume a variable amount of current, or using circuit elements
to perform calculations that are uncorrelated to the secure computation. Temporal noise
is introduced by inserting variations in timing and execution order. Methods include
using deliberately decorrelated and varying clocks, random wait states, random execution
re-ordering, use of dummy operations, and random branching [82]. Countermeasures
based on introducing noise do not remove secret-dependent information as well as not
addressing timing or fault attacks.
The recent trend of integrated decoupling capacitors is a key enabler of our security
guarantees. Before this trend, others have attempted to decouple system power from
security-critical circuit power, but have failed for a variety of reasons: not eliminating
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both power and timing side-channels [83, 34, 84], not addressing fault attacks [83, 34, 84],
and/or were trivially attacker-bypassable [83, 34]. Alternatively, Quantized Computing
eliminates both power and timing side-channels, is immune to a range of fault attacks,
and presents a strong security perimeter that forces the adversary to undertake expensive
and slow destructive analysis.
3.9 Conclusion
This work shows how system designers can leverage existing integrated decoupling ca-
pacitors for security, specifically, to protect security-critical computation from attackers
seeking to exploit power and timing side-channel emanations. We propose the idea of a
Quantization Controller that utilizes on-demand isolation and task-level atomicity guar-
antees to control the granularity of power and timing side-channels emanations, while
masking any secret-dependent variations. Our experimental results with real hardware
show that it is possible and practical to accomplish meaningful security-critical compu-
tation while being powered only by a decoupling capacitor. We see our isolation-based
approach enabling the construction of more secure systems; whether they be ultra-low-
power embedded devices or commodity servers.
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Chapter 4
Quantized Computing:
Electromagnetic Augmentation
With growing demand for secure low power IoT devices, embedded processors are ex-
pected to preform secure cryptographic algorithms. These algorithms are implemented
on physical platform that leak secure side-channel infromation [5]. These channels in-
clude power [6], timing [7], electromagnetic [8], acoustic [9], memory remanence [10],
and thermal [11]. The two most commonly exploited side-channels in literature are power
and timing [12].
Existing side-channel defense focus on the attacker’s signal-to-noise ratio: increasing
the noise or decreasing/hiding the signal. Countermeasures include: reducing the magni-
tude of side-channel emanations [30], the addition of noise to mask side-channel emana-
tions [31], obfuscation to hide the relative timing of the secret-revealing emanation [32],
and incorporating randomness at the software level [13]. The Quantization Controller in
Chapter 3 is a defensive design that reduces the visible signal through isolation. As such
it is able to defend against power, timing, fault, and power-glitching attacks. Forcing
an attacker to consider more complex and expensive techniques to capture side-channel
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information, such as Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel leakage.
EM side-channel attacks are similar to power side-channel attacks in that they both
extract power information [12]. The challenge with EM side-channel attacks is extracting
the desired signal from the noise, as all wires in a system that carry current contribute to
the EM field [67, 68]. There are existing EM side-channel countermeasures that reduce
the signal to noise ratio through shielding [69], adding power and ground planes [70],
and noise insertion [12]. However, EM shielding incurs high cost of packaging and noise
injection comes with significant power overheads making these unpractical for most ap-
plications.
While the Quantization Controller is not intended to deal with EM attacks, it does
make them more challenging. When the Quantization Controller isolates the crypto core
for secure execution, it dramatically shortens the wires in the IC that carry the bulk of the
current. This makes them a less effective antenna, reducing the signal the attacker is able
to capture [84]. This work will make the following contributions:
• Understanding of the root cause of EM leakage
• Analysis of EM leakage within an IC
• Proposed EM augmentation defense to the Quantization Controller
4.1 EM Leakage: Near-Field Radiation
EM emissions are the cause of current carrying traces in an IC. These traces act as an-
tennas that produce a signal proportional to the current in the trace. In CMOS based
IC designs sequential logic is executed on clock edges, causing a short burst of current
through the power traces. The sudden change in current following a clock edge causes
a change in the EM field surrounding the trace and a finite electromotive force given by
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Lenz’ Law, E = dΦBdt, where ΦB is the magnetic flux, i.e., ΦB =
∫
S B ·dS.
Compared to power side-channel attacks, which measure a collective signal from all
processes occurring within the chip, EM side-channel attacks can measure emanations
from localized components on the device that are positioned in close proximity to the EM
probe.
The EM field that is produced from a current carrying trace can generally be classified
into two regimes – a near-field and far-field signal. The far-field is what is traditionally
referred to as ”electromagnetic radiation,” and radiates energy from the source to infinity
as a result of accelerating charges in the source. Far-field radiation is typically found at
distances greater than 2D2/λ from the trace, where D is the size of the trace and λ is the
wavelength of the electromagnetic signal. Correspondingly, the near-field is found within
approximately 2D2/λ of the source and stores energy that is generated by the inductive
nature of the trace. Near-field EM probes, which can be bought off-the-shelf or fabricated
from a small metal plate or metal coil, effectively siphon energy from the near-field of
an antenna, thereby producing a current in a shunt resistor in the probe. In other words,
the current from the trace induces a current in the EM probe. The boundary between
the near and far field is not definitive, but generally a near-field probe must be within a
few wavelengths of the trace to measure a signal. For a 1 GHz clock with a fundamental
wavelength of 30 cm, mostly all measurable signals are from the near-field.
The EM field, whether near-field or far-field, is generally represented by the scalar
and vector potentials given by
Φ(r, t) =
∫
V
ρ(t− r/c)
4piε0 r
dV (4.1)
A(r, t) =
∫
V
µ0J(t− r/c)
4piε0 r
dV (4.2)
where ρ is the resistivity, r is the distance from the source, dV is the differential volume
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of the source, t is time, c is the speed of light, ε0 and µ0 are the vacuum permittivity and
permeability, and J is the current density.
In the case of a short wire with radius, d, length `, and current I(t) that is aligned
along the zˆ direction with uniform current density, J = I(t)/pid2zˆ , the vector potential is
given as
A =
µ0`
4pir
I0e− jkr
(
rˆ cosθ − θˆ sinθ) (4.3)
from which the magnetic and electric fields are derived as
B =
jkI0`
4pir
e− jkr
(
1+
1
jkr
)
φˆ (4.4)
E =
jkI0µ0
4piε0
e− jkr
{(
1
jkr
+
1
( jkr)2
)
2cosθ rˆ+
(
1+
1
jkr
+
1
( jkr)2
)
sinθ θˆ
}
(4.5)
where k is the wave number, 2pi/λ .
In the far-field region, kr 1,
E≈ jkI0`µ0
4piε0 r
e− jkr sinθ θˆ (4.6)
B≈ jkI0`
4pir
e− jkr sinθ φˆ (4.7)
indicating the expected 1/r dependence.
In the near-field, kr 1,
E≈ I0`
jω4piε0r3
(
2cosθ rˆ+ sinθ θˆ
)
(4.8)
B≈ I0`
4pir2
sinθ φˆ (4.9)
the latter of which is commonly refereed to as the Biot-Savart law. Evidently, the magnetic
field from a power rail on an IC, which induces a current in the EM probe, is proportional
to the current in the line and the length of the line, and drops off as 1/r2.
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It is evident from equation 4.9 that reducing the length and current of the secret car-
rying power rails could provide a decrease in the radiated signal.
4.2 EM Leakage: Wire Layers
Traditional multilayered ICs are composed of a semiconductor silicon layer (device layer)
at the bottom with multiple wire layers (metal layers) above interconnecting the device
layer [85]. Following equation 4.9 it is evident that the wire layers are the root cause
of the near-field radiation, acting as antennas, carrying current to throughout the device
layer. With the advancement of semiconductor technology, transistor sizes are scaling
down, the number of transistors in an IC are increasing. Therefore more interconnects
and power traces are required. As such IC process technologies have reduced in node
sizes and increased in wire layers. [18]
For the purposes of this work we focus on Intel’s process technologies. Since 1998
Intel’s semiconductor technology has evolved from 180nm to 10nm currently. However,
Intel has only released wire geometry information for there 180nm [14], 130nm [15],
65nm [16], 45nm [17], and 32nm [18]. Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 are a collection of the
dimensions provided by Intel.
As Intel’s semiconductor technology evolved so did the number of metal layers and
wire thicknesses. This is a result of having smaller transistor nodes, increasing the to-
tal number of transistors per IC requires more rooting and power. This is reflecting in
Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. The thickness of metal layer 1 grows smaller to connected to
the smaller semiconductors while the higher metal layers are thicker to distribute more
current throughout the IC. Traditionally ICs use a power grid to distribute power through
the ICs semiconductors. These power grids consume the top two thicker layers (one for
vertical and the other for horizontal routing) to grantee power and timing standards. To
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Technology 180 130 65 45 32
Metal 1 500 293 210 160 112.5
Metal 2 640 425 210 160 112.5
Metal 3 640 425 220 160 112.5
Metal 4 1080 718 280 240 168.8
Metal 5 1600 1064 330 280 225
Metal 6 1720 114 480 360 337.6
Metal 7 - - 720 560 450.1
Metal 8 - - 1080 810 566.5
Metal 9 - - - 30500 19400
Table 4.1: Pitch(nm)
Technology 180 130 65 45 32
Metal 1 480 280 170 144 95
Metal 2 700 360 190 144 95
Metal 3 700 360 200 144 95
Metal 4 1080 570 250 216 151
Metal 5 1600 900 300 252 204
Metal 6 1720 1200 430 324 303
Metal 7 - - 650 504 388
Metal 8 - - 975 720 504
Metal 9 - - - 7000 8000
Table 4.2: Thickness(nm)
Technology 180 130 65 45 32
Metal 1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.7
Metal 2 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7
Metal 3 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7
Metal 4 2 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8
Metal 5 2 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8
Metal 6 2 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8
Metal 7 - - 1.8 1.8 1.7
Metal 8 - - 1.8 1.8 1.8
Metal 9 - - - 0.4 1.5
Table 4.3: Aspect Ratio
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Technology 180 130 65 45 32
Metal 1 - - - - -
Metal 2 28 45 0 0 0
Metal 3 28 45 5 0 0
Metal 4 116 145 33 50 50
Metal 5 220 263 57 75 100
Metal 6 244 290 129 125 200
Metal 7 - - 243 250 300
Metal 8 - - 414 406 404
Metal 9 - - - 18963 17144
Table 4.4: Pitch(%) difference to Metal 1
Technology 180 130 65 45 32
Metal 1 - - - - -
Metal 2 46 29 12 0 0
Metal 3 46 29 18 0 0
Metal 4 125 104 47 50 59
Metal 5 233 221 76 75 115
Metal 6 258 329 153 125 219
Metal 7 - - 282 250 308
Metal 8 - - 474 400 431
Metal 9 - - - 4761 8321
Table 4.5: Thickness(%) difference to Metal 1
Technology 180 130 65 45 32
Metal 1 - - - - -
Metal 2 16 0 13 0 0
Metal 3 16 0 13 0 0
Metal 4 5 -6 13 0 6
Metal 5 5 0 13 0 6
Metal 6 5 24 13 0 6
Metal 7 - - 13 0 0
Metal 8 - - 13 0 6
Metal 9 - - - -78 -12
Table 4.6: Aspect Ratio(%) difference to Metal 1
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evaluate the evolution in Intel’s process technologies we calculate the percent difference
with respect to Metal Layer 1 in Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. We can observe a consistent
trend with Intel’s process technology, as semiconductors become smaller the difference
between its smallest metal layer (Metal 1) and the highest metal layers increases signifi-
cantly. This is a direct result of needing more wires and current to connect to more smaller
semiconductors throughout the IC. However with respect to EM side-channel attacks In-
tel’s current trend would increase its visible near-field ration footprint, as the length and
current values in equation 4.9 would increase.
4.2.1 Metal Layer: Modeling
To better understand and evaluate Intel’s current trend on the EM side-channel leakage
we need to measure the near field radiation of these wire layers. The net radiation can
be split into contributions originating from each interconnect in the routing. A simple
structure that can be used to analyze the radiation properties of different metal layers is
a vertical stack of interconnects of the same length, joined by vias. While this would not
accurately depict the interconnects of an actual IC layout, it will allow us to quantify the
effects of thickness on the near-field. In essence evaluating the near field, equation 4.9,
using a constant antenna length, l, and variable current, I0, that is based on the metal layer
dimensions. The larger the available trace, the more current that can pass.
For our model we used the dimensions provided by Intel’s 32nm [18] technology, val-
ues of which are provided in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. Following standard IC interconnects
guidelines [86] we can calculate the exact geometry of each wire layer. Figure 4.1 is an
illustration of the wire layers geometry and variables. Using Equations 4.10 and 4.11 we
are able to calculate the additional parameters need to create an exact model of Intel’s
32nm wire layer.
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Figure 4.1: Wire Layer Geometry.
AspectRatio =
t
w
=⇒ w = t
AspectRatio
(4.10)
Pitch = w+ s =⇒ s = Pitch−w (4.11)
The simple structure layout we modeled for this experiment is shown in Figures 4.2
and 4.3. The length of each interconnected layer in this model is set to be 3µm. While
there is a slight increase in thickness between metal layers, Figure 4.3 illustrates the sig-
nificant difference between metal layer 9 and the rest.
These models were built using Ansoft HFSS, a finite element method (FEM) based
EM simulator to solve Maxwell’s equations. The excitation for our interconnect is pro-
vided via a lumped port in HFSS between the bottom-most metal layer and a perfect
electric conductor (PEC) plate functioning as a ground. This style of excitation is similar
to a dipole antenna and is justified due to the similarity of the system to an infinitesimal
dipole. Representing the close proximity of an attacker a radiation boundary of 1mm ra-
dius enclosing the interconnect stack is used to simulate the region. Limiting the analysis
and eliminating reflection of incident radiation from the outer surface.
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Figure 4.2: HFSS model of Intel 32nm Metal Layer - exluding Metal Layer 9.
Figure 4.3: HFSS model of Intel 32nm Metal Layer.
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4.3 Metal Layer: Simulating EM-Fields
The EM radiation of an IC primarily originates from the metal layer interconnects act-
ing as mini-antennas. To develop a better understanding of these mini-antennas the net
radiation can be split into contributions originating from each metal layer in the routing.
The model in Figure 4.3 is excited at 1 GHz, and the electric field amplitude is measured.
The magnetic field is negligible in this model as electrically activated plates dominate the
electric field in the near-field region, whereas with current loops magnetic fields would
dominate the near-field. Therefore with closed loop differential elements in a chip, we
would want to measure the magnetic field using a similar analysis.
The near-field electrical radiation patterns are shown in Figure 4.4. To analysis the
contributions of each metal layer in the routing we repeat the simulation multiple times,
each time removing the topmost metal layer. This allows us to calculate there electrical
radiation contribution of each metal layer depicted in Figure 4.5. The electric field contri-
bution of metal layers 1 through 8 appear to increase linear, but metal layer 9 contributes
significantly more than the rest of the metal layers. As metal layer 9 is part of the power
grid that disseminates current throughout the IC, it is ideal for leaking power information.
Any significant EM countermeasure would have to mitigate the leakage cause my metal
layer 9 routing.
4.4 Threat Model
Our threat model assumes an attacker with knowledge of the software running on as
well as with full physical access to an IC. The attacker’s objective is to extract secret
information through non-destructive, non-invasive, EM side-channel analysis. We assume
that the attacker can also control the device’s environment to induce power and thermal
faults.
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Figure 4.4: Metal Layer E-Field decay over distance.
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Following our observations of the metal layers contribution to EM radiation, we de-
velop an augmentation to the Quantization Controller to mitigate EM radiation from the
top two metal layers. Our design inherits the Quantization Controller defenses against
power, timing, thermal, power glitching, and memory fault attacks while significantly
reducing EM leakage.
4.5 Design
Equation 4.9 quantifies the near field radiation strength of these mini-antennas based on
two variable properties the length and current of the antennas. Any proposed design
trying to reduce EM radiation effectively will need to reduce the visible footprints from
the metal layers mini-antennas. In this work, we have identified that the top tiers generate
the majority of the near-field radiation footprint. These top tiers are used as a power grid
for disseminating power throughout the IC. To augment the Quantization Controller with
an EM countermeasure we need to effectively reduce both the current draw and length of
the power grid on these top tier metal layers.
During secure execution the Quantization Controller uses internal decoupling capac-
itors to power an internally isolated power grid. Following Kirchhoffs Current Law for
parallel capacitors we can replace the internal decoupling capacitor with a bank of n
smaller capacitors that total the same value:
Ctotal =C1 +C2 + ...+Cn (4.12)
Itotal =C1
dv
dt
+C2
dv
dt
+ ...+Cn
dv
dt
(4.13)
By spreading out these smaller capacitors along the internally isolated power grid, we
would effectively be reducing the length and current of the mini antennas. Potentially
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removing the current draw across the power grid during secure execution by using local-
ized capacitors to power semiconductor cells. Such a design would significantly reduce
the EM footprint during secure execution for the Quantization Controller.
At the time of writing this thesis parts of Quantization Controller - EM Augmentation
are under restricted access. The design aspect of this work was completed at MIT Lincoln
Labs and is currently being reviewed for release. For this reason, we are unable to provide
details, designs, simulations, and evaluations of the proposed design.
4.6 Discussion
Given that our design augments the Quantization Controller with EM mitigation we effec-
tively reduce the visible footprint of power, timing, and EM side-channel leakage while
also addressing a range of fault attacks. Our design forces attackers to use more compli-
cated and expensive techniques to capture side-channel information.
Currently, the weakest design requirement of the EM augmentation is its uniform
execution. To optimize our design and minimize its overhead we require that all cell exe-
cution uniformly drain power from there capacitor banks. Thereby preventing capacitors
banks of different cells from sharing charge and inducing a current through the top two
tiers. Although uniform execution is a common EM side channel countermeasure due
to the nature of our proposed design attackers could potentially force specific cells to
execute non-uniformly thereby causing undesired charge flow across the top two tiers.
Should our proposed design effectively mitigate leakage against non-invasive passive
attacks, attackers with full physical access maybe be forced to induce leakage actively.
Active attacks would require significantly more complicated, expensive, and invasive
techniques such as etching and targeted thermal fluctuations. By etching away the cover
of the IC and exposing the substrate and metal layers, attackers can manipulate the charge
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of the power capacitors. Attackers can then add or remove charge forcing a non-uniform
discharge of the power capacitors. Causing the capacitors to share charge, thereby induc-
ing a current through the top two tiers. Such attacks would raise the threat level of an
attacker to a nation-state, due to the complexity and cost of such an attack.
To counter uniform execution, we examine isolating each cell during secure execution.
However, we determine that such a design would incur significant overhead. By adding
PMOS switches between each cell, we would add a large area footprint and a constant
power overhead on the internal power rail in both secure and insecure mode. We would
also add power limitations due to current flow through serial PMOS switches. While
isolating each cell during secure execution with PMOS switches would allow for non-
uniform executions the current design overhead is not ideal.
4.7 Conclusion
Our evaluation into the source of EM leakage has shown that the metal layers of an IC,
used to interconnect the device layer, act as mini-antennas that produce near field radiation
that leakage information. Equation 4.9 quantifies the near field radiation strength of these
mini-antennas based on two variable properties the length and current of the antennas.
We simulate a simple wire layer struct to measure the contributions of each wire layers.
Figures 4.4 and Figures 4.5 show EM that the EM footprint grows with each wire layer
depending on its thickness. We observed a significantly larger increase with the top tier
as it is substantially larger than the previous metal layers.
Traditionally the top tiers are used as a power grid to disseminate power throughout
the IC, the thicker the metal layer the more current that can pass. As semiconductors con-
tinue to emerge smaller consequently: they will be more densely packed, requiring small
wires to connect to, more interconnecting metal layers, and thicker layers for more current
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flow. With respect to EM side-channel attacks, the consequences of smaller semiconduc-
tors will only increase the near-field radiation footprint. Analyzing the metal layer dimen-
sions of Intel’s IC technology nodes for 180nm [14], 130nm [15], 65nm [16], 45nm [17],
and 32nm [18] we can observe in Tables 4.1 through 4.6 an increase in the number of
wire layers, smaller initial metal layers, and significantly large top metal layers.
To augment the Quantization Controller with an EM countermeasure we need to effec-
tively reduce both the current draw and length of these metal layer mini-antennas created
in any design layout. During secure execution the Quantization Controller uses internal
decoupling capacitors as a power source. By leveraging this isolation feature, we can
distribute the decoupling capacitors along the internal isolated power rail reducing the
effective length and current draw of the metal layer mini antennas. Such a design would
significantly reduce the EM footprint during secure execution for the Quantization Con-
troller.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
With the increasing demand of new IoT devices comes new security threats that have yet
to be properly evaluated [2]. In this work we developed a customized IoT, µLeech, that
acts as a TPM for smartphones. µLeech mimics the properties of low power embedded
IoTs allowing use to develop an evaluation platform to study the side-channel leakage of
IoTs. Over the course of this evaluation we observed that low power scavenging tech-
niques could be leveraged to create a side-channel isolation countermeasure. We design
our Quantization Controller to create uniform power and timing footprints during secure
execution. We augment the Quantization Controller design to defend against thermal,
power glitching, memory fault, and EM attacks.
This chapter concludes the thesis by presenting a summary of the results and recom-
mendations for future work.
5.0.1 Summary of Results
5.0.1.1 µLeech
µLeech is a low power platform on which to run cryptographic operations. As such, its
performance is mainly determined in power consumption. The less power it consumes
87
the less power it ultimately needs to drain from a smartphone. The power consumption of
µLeech was evaluated by looking at different sleep and active implementation sates.
µLeech power consumption of sleep states are available in Table 2.3. These results
show that the lowest power consuming sleep state is Static Sleep at 56.7µA. Currently we
are using Deep Stop Sleep which consumes 68.3 µA. Using Static Sleep would require
us to reset our interrupts, counter, and comparator clocks. As a result there would be
a clock initialization phase at the start of ever wake cycle, ultimately consuming more
power. In addition, depending on when the sleep state was activated an event reset may
be required at wake, due to the clock reset, resulting in wasted cycles/power. For these
reasons we are currently using Deep Stop Sleep, the second lowest power consuming
sleep state available. With the prototype completed now, further testing of the different
wake protocols may show which sleep state is ultimately more efficient.
Table 2.3 also shows µLeech power consumption of active states. The highest power
consuming phase of our µLeech is its communication phase. Transmitting and receiving
data is consuming 575 µA and 588 µA respectively. While 128-bit AES is consuming
555 µA. These result shows that there are two things that need to be researched further, to
optimize our design. First, can we achieve lower power consumption from our communi-
cation protocol implementation. Second, how far can we push our AES implementation
while keeping an eye on our power consumption and capacitor bank. Possible allowing
us to increasing our CPU clock speed, currently 1 MHz.
5.0.1.2 Qunatized Computing
Our Quantization Controller design shows how system designers can leverage existing in-
tegrated decoupling capacitors for security, specifically, to protect security-critical com-
putation from attackers seeking to exploit power and timing side-channel emanations.
Simulations (Figures 3.5, 3.6) of proposed design illustrate how we leverage integrated
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decoupling capacitors to create uniform timing and power footprints. This effect is also
illustrated in Figure 3.2, that depicts the measured footprint of a real hardware imple-
mentation of our Quantization Controller. Our design is centered around the relationship
between the size of the decoupling capacitors and their discharge rate during execution,
quantified by equation 3.3. To optimize this relationship we analyzed three different em-
bedded processor, shown in Table 3.2. Evaluating the different parameters of these pro-
cessors and there effects on equation 3.3 i.e. computation time, average current, and volt-
age range. We measure memory performances (Figure 3.7) and execution performances
(Figures 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14) using AES and RSA implementations, to
optimize our Quantization Controller implementation.
Our Quantization Controller utilizes on-demand isolation and task-level atomicity to
control the granularity of power and timing side-channels emanations, while masking any
secret-dependent variations. Our experimental results with real hardware show that it is
possible and practical to accomplish meaningful security-critical computation while being
powered only by a decoupling capacitor. We see our isolation-based approach enabling
the construction of more secure systems; whether they be ultra-low-power embedded
devices or commodity servers.
5.0.1.3 Quantized Computing: EM Augmentation
The two most commonly exploited side-channels in literature are power and timing [12].
Our Quantization Controller in Chapter 3 is a defensive design that reduces the visible
signal through isolation. As such it is able to defend against power, timing, fault, and
power-glitching attacks. Forcing attackers to consider more complex and expensive tech-
niques to capture side-channel information, such as EM side-channel leakage.
Our evaluation into the source of EM leakage has shown that the metal layers of an
IC, used to interconnect the device layer, act as mini-antennas that produce near field
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radiation that leakage information. The strength of the near field radiation is dictated by
the length and current of these antennas, quantified in equation 4.9. We analyze Intel’s IC
technology nodes for: 180nm [14], 130nm [15], 65nm [16], 45nm [17], and 32nm [18].
As tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 show there is an increase in the size of the wire layer as you go
up the IC. With a significant increase between the top metal layer and the bottom metal
layer.
This is due to the fact that as smaller technology nodes are developed semiconductors
become smaller and are therefore more densely packed. Smaller technology nodes will
require smaller wire to interconnect, more wire layers, and thicker wires to carry current
throughout the IC. For this reason the top two layers are traditionally used as a power
grid, the thicker layer are able to provide more current throughout the IC. However with
respect to EM side-channel attacks these layers would increase the near-field radiation
footprint, as the length and current values in equation 4.9 would increase. Figures 4.4 and
Figures 4.5 support this clam as the EM footprint grows with each wire layer depending
on its thickness.
5.0.2 Recommendations for Future Work
5.0.2.1 µLeech
Currently the biggest bottle neck in our design is our communication protocols. We ini-
tially developed a simple communication protocol that is constantly communicating. This
was done to mimic other IoT communication protocols, i.e. Square-point-of-sale, and Hi-
jack. Such IoTs require continuous execution and communication, requiring more power
and timing overhead. µLeech executes and communicates in burst cycles. Therefore, a
more efficient protocol for µLeech can be implemented that takes advantage of its burst
nature. This would optimize the libraries we use on the smartphone app and the proces-
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sor’s state-machine. In doing so, our communication protocol could:
• Only need 1 Idle cycle. At most we only need 1 Idle cycle between byte trans-
missions. Currently there are four idle cycles for our processor and twenty idle
cycles for our smartphone between every byte transmission. This would ultimately
improving transmission speeds.
• Possibly attain higher baud rates. Our data is predetermined at the start of the
transmission, therefore the transmission buffer can be full pre-loaded allowing us
to optimize timing. Allowing use to achieve higher baud rates, the limitation would
turn to the smartphone’s frequency modulation.
• Not need a state-machine. The communication protocols could be moved to the
interrupt level entirely. We would not need a state machine to determine when
to go to idle, transmit, receive, and when to build the transmit or receive buffers.
Our communication would be in burst serial sequences. Therefore receiving and
transmitting would be a serial process and could never happen simultaneously. This
would allow us to pre-encode buffers using Manchester encoded and pre-load the
data buffers as the data would be predetermined before transmitting.
• Not need a counter. The counter used to determine the space between comparisons
when receiving data can be removed. Our AVR comparator is a synchronous com-
parator and can be used to decode the Manchester input directly, without using a
counter. This would improve incoming data speeds and reduce power consumption.
• Allow our smartphone app to transmit in bursts. Having modified our processor
to only transmit and receive when necessary this smartphone app could be modified
to do the same. Having the smartphone continuously transmit on the power channel
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but only transmit and receive data when necessary and in bursts, would significantly
reduce the power overhead of the smartphone.
Such a communication protocol would allow for a much more efficient implementa-
tion protocol for µLeech. However we would still be using Manchester encoding. There
maybe other methods to achieving higher baud rates for our communication protocol that
do not involve Manchester encoding. Currently Manchester encoding doubles the clock
rate since ever bit is represent by two bits. The reason for using Manchester encoding
is due to the fact that smartphone tones are a continuously oscillating waveform, and
cannot represent high or low. Therefore Manchester encoding allows us to transmit by
affecting the frequency without affecting the amplitude of the waveform. Other options
may include modifying the amplitude of the waveform without affecting its frequency,
such as volume control. If we could create a communication protocol that does not use
Manchester encoding we could at the very least double our baud rate.
5.0.2.2 Qunatized Computing
The Quantization Controller was tested using real hardware, Figure 3.8, to verify func-
tionality, Figure 3.2. The Quantization Controller was tested to effectivly protect against
power, timing, thermal, power glitching, and memory fault attacks. However we used a
breadboarded prototype, therefore the next steps would include:
• Fabrication. The proposed design takes advantage of being integrated within the
IC, this restricts attacker access to our design and the internal rail. We prototype
our design using real hardware on a breadboard, Figure 3.8, to verify functionality,
Figure 3.2. The final iteration should be fabricated within an IC design to maintain
our threat model.
• Testing and benchmarks. With a customized fabricated IC we will be able to
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preform tests using real hardware. This would allow use to quantify the effects of
our countermeasures using an IC. We would expect these effects to closely resemble
our pro-typed hardware version illustrated in Figure 3.2. An IC iteration would
allow use to evaluate breakpoints and benchmarks of our design allowing use to
further optimize the final design.
5.0.2.3 Quantized Computing: EM Augmentation
At the time of writing this thesis parts of Quantization Controller - EM Augmentation
are under restricted access. The design aspect of this work was completed at MIT Lin-
coln Labs and are currently being reviewed for release. Should the proposed design be
accepted for release the next steps would include:
• Integration with the Quantization Controller. The proposed design takes ad-
vantage of the isolation nature of the Quantization Controller. The Quantization
Controller effectively uses the integrated decoupling capacitors as power sources.
We would need to create a customized IC design that integrate the Quantization
Controller with the proposed design.
• Fabrication. The nature of the problem we are trying to mitigate forces use to
fabricate to preform a real hardware test. The source of EM radiation we are trying
to mitigate is caused by the IC wire layers acting as antennas. As these wire layer
antennas are shorter then there wave length, evaluations with larger antennas would
be meaningless. Therefore the only real verification would need to be preformed
using a Fabricated IC with an integrated Quantization Controller and the proposed
EM augmentation design.
• Testing and benchmarks. With a customized fabricated IC we will be able to
preform tests using real hardware. This would allow use to quantify the effects
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of our proposed design on EM leakage of real hardware. We would also be able to
evaluate breakpoints and benchmarks of our design allowing use to further optimize
the final design.
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